全在家里?创始董事与家族治理对小额信贷机构社会绩效的影响

IF 4.6 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Shahadat Hossain, Jeremy Galbreath, Mostafa Monzur Hasan, Trond Randøy
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引用次数: 0

摘要

研究问题/议题 本研究调查了家族治理(包括创始人董事及其与董事会中家族成员的关系)对小额贷款机构(MFIs)社会绩效的影响,小额贷款机构是一种具有双重目标的特殊社会企业。 研究结果/启示 利用 2007 年至 2017 年在孟加拉国运营的 735 家小额信贷机构的数据集,我们发现创始人董事以及与创始人有家族关系的董事会成员对小额信贷机构的社会绩效有不利影响。在我们进行了若干稳健性检验和内生性检验后,这些发现仍然成立。 理论/学术意义 我们从两个方面对小额贷款机构和社会企业的公司治理文献做出了贡献。首先,我们的研究结果表明,当小额贷款机构面临双重绩效目标时,创始人董事可能会 "权衡 "社会成果与经济成果,从而对小额贷款机构的社会绩效产生不利影响。其次,我们的研究结果表明,与创始人董事有家族关系的董事会成员的存在也会对小额贷款机构的社会绩效产生不利影响,从而扩展了相关文献。 实践者/政策启示 本研究表明,小额贷款机构董事会的组成会影响其治理以及有效监督其社会和财务绩效的能力。如果小额贷款机构的社会绩效是国家政策制定者的主要关注点,那么就应该制定相关法规,限制招聘有家族关系的董事会成员。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
All in the family? The impact of founder directors and family governance on microfinance institutions' social performance

Research Question/Issue

This study investigates the impact of family governance, including founder directors and their ties to family members on the board, on the social performance of microfinance institutions (MFIs), a special kind of social enterprise with dual objectives.

Research Findings/Insights

Using a dataset of 735 MFIs operating in Bangladesh from 2007 to 2017, we find that founder directors and board members with family ties to the founder have an adverse impact on MFIs' social performance. These findings hold when we perform several robustness tests and endogeneity tests.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

We contribute to the corporate governance literature on MFIs and social enterprises in two ways. First, our findings suggest that, when MFIs are confronted with dual performance objectives, founder directors may “trade off” social outcomes in favor of economic outcomes and therefore adversely affect MFIs' social performance. Second, our findings extend the literature by showing that the presence of board members with family ties to founder directors also adversely affects MFIs' social performance.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

This study suggests that MFIs' board composition influences their governance and ability to oversee their social and financial performance effectively. If MFIs' social performance is a major concern of national policy makers, then regulation should be put in place to limit board recruitment with family ties.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.00
自引率
11.30%
发文量
79
期刊介绍: The mission of Corporate Governance: An International Review is to publish cutting-edge international business research on the phenomena of comparative corporate governance throughout the global economy. Our ultimate goal is a rigorous and relevant global theory of corporate governance. We define corporate governance broadly as the exercise of power over corporate entities so as to increase the value provided to the organization"s various stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm. Because of this broad conceptualization, a wide variety of academic disciplines can contribute to our understanding.
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