{"title":"家族所有权和控制权是否会影响采用《国际财务报告准则》的后果?","authors":"Chloe Yu-Hsuan Wu, Hwa-Hsien Hsu, Che-Hung Lin","doi":"10.1111/corg.12537","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div>\n \n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\n \n <p>This study investigates whether the impact of the mandatory adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on earnings management practices varies between family and non-family firms. Specifically, we examine the effects of different family ownership configurations and the CEO family identity.</p>\n </section>\n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\n \n <p>We find that firms in Taiwan use less accrual-based earnings management (ABEM) under the IFRS but more real earnings management (REM). On average, IFRS adoption is less likely to result in upward ABEM and REM in family firms than in non-family firms. However, family firms with greater family ownership, lower family cash–vote divergence, a founder CEO, or a professional CEO are more likely to promote the positive effect of the IFRS on ABEM and mitigate the negative effect of the IFRS on REM. Furthermore, these firms are less likely to substitute ABEM with REM after the transition to the IFRS.</p>\n </section>\n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\n \n <p>While recent literature has paid increasing attention to various governance characteristics that shape management's reporting incentives and, thus, affect the consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption, we focus on family firms in which the principal–principal agency relationship between controlling owners and other shareholders is salient. We highlight the effect of family owners' different agency features in relation to a structural change in the accounting regime.</p>\n </section>\n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\n \n <p>This study addresses how a firm's corporate governance influences the net benefits of implementing new accounting standards. Our evidence offers insights to policymakers and capital market participants, showing that variations in family owners' reporting incentives may have different impacts on the consequences of adopting the IFRS.</p>\n </section>\n </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6000,"publicationDate":"2023-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Do family ownership and control influence the consequences of IFRS adoption?\",\"authors\":\"Chloe Yu-Hsuan Wu, Hwa-Hsien Hsu, Che-Hung Lin\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/corg.12537\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div>\\n \\n \\n <section>\\n \\n <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\\n \\n <p>This study investigates whether the impact of the mandatory adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on earnings management practices varies between family and non-family firms. Specifically, we examine the effects of different family ownership configurations and the CEO family identity.</p>\\n </section>\\n \\n <section>\\n \\n <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\\n \\n <p>We find that firms in Taiwan use less accrual-based earnings management (ABEM) under the IFRS but more real earnings management (REM). On average, IFRS adoption is less likely to result in upward ABEM and REM in family firms than in non-family firms. However, family firms with greater family ownership, lower family cash–vote divergence, a founder CEO, or a professional CEO are more likely to promote the positive effect of the IFRS on ABEM and mitigate the negative effect of the IFRS on REM. Furthermore, these firms are less likely to substitute ABEM with REM after the transition to the IFRS.</p>\\n </section>\\n \\n <section>\\n \\n <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\\n \\n <p>While recent literature has paid increasing attention to various governance characteristics that shape management's reporting incentives and, thus, affect the consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption, we focus on family firms in which the principal–principal agency relationship between controlling owners and other shareholders is salient. We highlight the effect of family owners' different agency features in relation to a structural change in the accounting regime.</p>\\n </section>\\n \\n <section>\\n \\n <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\\n \\n <p>This study addresses how a firm's corporate governance influences the net benefits of implementing new accounting standards. Our evidence offers insights to policymakers and capital market participants, showing that variations in family owners' reporting incentives may have different impacts on the consequences of adopting the IFRS.</p>\\n </section>\\n </div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48209,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Corporate Governance-An International Review\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-06-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Corporate Governance-An International Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/corg.12537\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/corg.12537","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Do family ownership and control influence the consequences of IFRS adoption?
Research Question/Issue
This study investigates whether the impact of the mandatory adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on earnings management practices varies between family and non-family firms. Specifically, we examine the effects of different family ownership configurations and the CEO family identity.
Research Findings/Insights
We find that firms in Taiwan use less accrual-based earnings management (ABEM) under the IFRS but more real earnings management (REM). On average, IFRS adoption is less likely to result in upward ABEM and REM in family firms than in non-family firms. However, family firms with greater family ownership, lower family cash–vote divergence, a founder CEO, or a professional CEO are more likely to promote the positive effect of the IFRS on ABEM and mitigate the negative effect of the IFRS on REM. Furthermore, these firms are less likely to substitute ABEM with REM after the transition to the IFRS.
Theoretical/Academic Implications
While recent literature has paid increasing attention to various governance characteristics that shape management's reporting incentives and, thus, affect the consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption, we focus on family firms in which the principal–principal agency relationship between controlling owners and other shareholders is salient. We highlight the effect of family owners' different agency features in relation to a structural change in the accounting regime.
Practitioner/Policy Implications
This study addresses how a firm's corporate governance influences the net benefits of implementing new accounting standards. Our evidence offers insights to policymakers and capital market participants, showing that variations in family owners' reporting incentives may have different impacts on the consequences of adopting the IFRS.
期刊介绍:
The mission of Corporate Governance: An International Review is to publish cutting-edge international business research on the phenomena of comparative corporate governance throughout the global economy. Our ultimate goal is a rigorous and relevant global theory of corporate governance. We define corporate governance broadly as the exercise of power over corporate entities so as to increase the value provided to the organization"s various stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm. Because of this broad conceptualization, a wide variety of academic disciplines can contribute to our understanding.