家族所有权和控制权是否会影响采用《国际财务报告准则》的后果?

IF 4.6 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Chloe Yu-Hsuan Wu, Hwa-Hsien Hsu, Che-Hung Lin
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引用次数: 0

摘要

研究问题 本研究探讨了强制采用《国际财务报告准则》(IFRS)对家族企业和非家族企业盈利管理实践的影响是否存在差异。具体而言,我们研究了不同家族所有权配置和首席执行官家族身份的影响。 研究结果/见解 我们发现,台湾企业在《国际财务报告准则》下较少使用应计制收益管理(ABEM),但较多使用实际收益管理(REM)。平均而言,与非家族企业相比,家族企业采用《国际财务报告准则》导致应计制收益管理和实际收益管理上升的可能性较低。然而,家族持股比例较高、家族现金投票分歧较小、拥有创始人首席执行官或专业首席执行官的家族企业更有可能促进《国际财务报告准则》对 ABEM 的积极影响,并减轻《国际财务报告准则》对 REM 的消极影响。此外,在过渡到《国际财务报告准则》后,这些公司不太可能用REM替代ABEM。 理论/学术启示 最近的文献越来越关注各种治理特征,这些特征会影响管理层的报告动机,从而影响强制采用《国际财务报告准则》的后果。我们强调了家族所有者不同的代理特征对会计制度结构变化的影响。 实践者/政策启示 本研究探讨了公司治理如何影响实施新会计准则的净收益。我们的证据为政策制定者和资本市场参与者提供了启示,表明家族所有者报告动机的不同可能会对采用《国际财务报告准则》的后果产生不同的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Do family ownership and control influence the consequences of IFRS adoption?

Research Question/Issue

This study investigates whether the impact of the mandatory adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on earnings management practices varies between family and non-family firms. Specifically, we examine the effects of different family ownership configurations and the CEO family identity.

Research Findings/Insights

We find that firms in Taiwan use less accrual-based earnings management (ABEM) under the IFRS but more real earnings management (REM). On average, IFRS adoption is less likely to result in upward ABEM and REM in family firms than in non-family firms. However, family firms with greater family ownership, lower family cash–vote divergence, a founder CEO, or a professional CEO are more likely to promote the positive effect of the IFRS on ABEM and mitigate the negative effect of the IFRS on REM. Furthermore, these firms are less likely to substitute ABEM with REM after the transition to the IFRS.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

While recent literature has paid increasing attention to various governance characteristics that shape management's reporting incentives and, thus, affect the consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption, we focus on family firms in which the principal–principal agency relationship between controlling owners and other shareholders is salient. We highlight the effect of family owners' different agency features in relation to a structural change in the accounting regime.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

This study addresses how a firm's corporate governance influences the net benefits of implementing new accounting standards. Our evidence offers insights to policymakers and capital market participants, showing that variations in family owners' reporting incentives may have different impacts on the consequences of adopting the IFRS.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.00
自引率
11.30%
发文量
79
期刊介绍: The mission of Corporate Governance: An International Review is to publish cutting-edge international business research on the phenomena of comparative corporate governance throughout the global economy. Our ultimate goal is a rigorous and relevant global theory of corporate governance. We define corporate governance broadly as the exercise of power over corporate entities so as to increase the value provided to the organization"s various stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm. Because of this broad conceptualization, a wide variety of academic disciplines can contribute to our understanding.
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