{"title":"假设评估的失败是妄想信念的一个因素。","authors":"Max Coltheart, Martin Davies","doi":"10.1080/13546805.2021.1914016","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><strong>Introduction: </strong>In accounts of the two-factor theory of delusional belief, the second factor in this theory has been referred to only in the most general terms, as a failure in the processes of hypothesis evaluation, with no attempt to characterise those processes in any detail. Coltheart and Davies ([2021]. How unexpected observations lead to new beliefs: A Peircean pathway. <i>Consciousness and Cognition</i>, <i>87</i>, 103037. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2020.103037) attempted such a characterisation, proposing a detailed eight-step model of how unexpected observations lead to new beliefs based on the concept of abductive inference as introduced by Charles Sanders Peirce.</p><p><strong>Methods: </strong>In this paper, we apply that model to the explanation of various forms of delusional belief.</p><p><strong>Results: </strong>We provide evidence that in cases of delusion there is a specific failure of the seventh step in our model: the step at which predictions from (delusional) hypotheses are considered in the light of relevant evidence.</p><p><strong>Conclusions: </strong>In the two-factor theory of delusional belief, the second factor consists of a failure to reject hypotheses in the face of disconfirmatory evidence.</p>","PeriodicalId":51277,"journal":{"name":"Cognitive Neuropsychiatry","volume":"26 4","pages":"213-230"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/13546805.2021.1914016","citationCount":"9","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Failure of hypothesis evaluation as a factor in delusional belief.\",\"authors\":\"Max Coltheart, Martin Davies\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/13546805.2021.1914016\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><strong>Introduction: </strong>In accounts of the two-factor theory of delusional belief, the second factor in this theory has been referred to only in the most general terms, as a failure in the processes of hypothesis evaluation, with no attempt to characterise those processes in any detail. Coltheart and Davies ([2021]. How unexpected observations lead to new beliefs: A Peircean pathway. <i>Consciousness and Cognition</i>, <i>87</i>, 103037. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2020.103037) attempted such a characterisation, proposing a detailed eight-step model of how unexpected observations lead to new beliefs based on the concept of abductive inference as introduced by Charles Sanders Peirce.</p><p><strong>Methods: </strong>In this paper, we apply that model to the explanation of various forms of delusional belief.</p><p><strong>Results: </strong>We provide evidence that in cases of delusion there is a specific failure of the seventh step in our model: the step at which predictions from (delusional) hypotheses are considered in the light of relevant evidence.</p><p><strong>Conclusions: </strong>In the two-factor theory of delusional belief, the second factor consists of a failure to reject hypotheses in the face of disconfirmatory evidence.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":51277,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Cognitive Neuropsychiatry\",\"volume\":\"26 4\",\"pages\":\"213-230\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/13546805.2021.1914016\",\"citationCount\":\"9\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Cognitive Neuropsychiatry\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"3\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546805.2021.1914016\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"医学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"2021/4/20 0:00:00\",\"PubModel\":\"Epub\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"PSYCHIATRY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Cognitive Neuropsychiatry","FirstCategoryId":"3","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13546805.2021.1914016","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2021/4/20 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"PSYCHIATRY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 9
摘要
导言:在妄想信念的双因素理论中,这个理论中的第二个因素只是在最一般的术语中被提及,作为假设评估过程中的失败,没有试图在任何细节上描述这些过程。colheart and Davies[2021]。意想不到的观察如何导致新的信念:一条裴尔海之路。意识与认知,87,103037。https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2020.103037)尝试了这样一个特征,提出了一个详细的八步模型,该模型基于查尔斯·桑德斯·皮尔斯引入的溯因推理概念,说明意外的观察如何导致新的信念。方法:在本文中,我们应用该模型来解释各种形式的妄想信念。结果:我们提供的证据表明,在妄想的情况下,我们的模型中有一个具体的第七步失败:根据相关证据考虑(妄想)假设的预测的步骤。结论:在妄想信念的双因素理论中,第二个因素包括在面对不证实的证据时不能拒绝假设。
Failure of hypothesis evaluation as a factor in delusional belief.
Introduction: In accounts of the two-factor theory of delusional belief, the second factor in this theory has been referred to only in the most general terms, as a failure in the processes of hypothesis evaluation, with no attempt to characterise those processes in any detail. Coltheart and Davies ([2021]. How unexpected observations lead to new beliefs: A Peircean pathway. Consciousness and Cognition, 87, 103037. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2020.103037) attempted such a characterisation, proposing a detailed eight-step model of how unexpected observations lead to new beliefs based on the concept of abductive inference as introduced by Charles Sanders Peirce.
Methods: In this paper, we apply that model to the explanation of various forms of delusional belief.
Results: We provide evidence that in cases of delusion there is a specific failure of the seventh step in our model: the step at which predictions from (delusional) hypotheses are considered in the light of relevant evidence.
Conclusions: In the two-factor theory of delusional belief, the second factor consists of a failure to reject hypotheses in the face of disconfirmatory evidence.
期刊介绍:
Cognitive Neuropsychiatry (CNP) publishes high quality empirical and theoretical papers in the multi-disciplinary field of cognitive neuropsychiatry. Specifically the journal promotes the study of cognitive processes underlying psychological and behavioural abnormalities, including psychotic symptoms, with and without organic brain disease. Since 1996, CNP has published original papers, short reports, case studies and theoretical and empirical reviews in fields of clinical and cognitive neuropsychiatry, which have a bearing on the understanding of normal cognitive processes. Relevant research from cognitive neuroscience, cognitive neuropsychology and clinical populations will also be considered.
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