Model-Free Output Regulation of Networked Systems Under Unknown Hybrid Attacks.

This article considers the output regulation problem for an unknown discrete-time system subject to the random combination of denial-of-service, replay, and deception attacks on both sensor-controller and controller-actuator channels. We propose a learning-based receding-horizon control with historical output signals. It offers two advantages over state and output feedback regulators in the sense that it requires neither exact knowledge of system dynamics nor a direct measurement of external disturbance on one hand, and on the other hand, it can counteract the adverse impact of hybrid attacks on the executive capability of the actuator, regardless of the seriously tampered data on the sensor-controller channel. To overcome technical difficulties from hybrid attacks on both channels, we generalize the Markov-parameter-based time-series control method to generate a data packet containing the current and future control inputs, which are further compromised on the controller-actuator channel. Thus, a recovery procedure is additionally designed to solve the model-free output regulation problem by distinguishing the undamaged predicted inputs based on the proposed hybrid attack detection procedure.