管理工作保障与企业多元化

IF 2.4 2区经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Empirical Finance Pub Date : 2025-09-02 DOI:10.1016/j.jempfin.2025.101646

Ziwen Bu , Suyang Li , Rongbing Xiao

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们分析了管理职位保障对企业多元化的影响。我们的研究结果表明，制定法律保护管理人员的就业有利于减少公司多元化。我们的研究结果表明，与管理堑壕和帝国建设理论相关，对冲就业风险更有可能成为管理者决定进行公司多元化的主要因素。与代理理论对企业多元化的解释一致，我们也证明了重新聚焦的企业在制定隐含契约例外后增加了企业价值。企业价值的增加可能反映了跨部门资本配置效率的提高，因为我们发现企业在采用法律后提高了资本配置效率。

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Managerial job security and firm diversification

We analyze the effects of managerial job security on firm diversification. Our results indicate that enacting legal protection for managers’ employment is conducive to less corporate diversification. Our findings suggest that, in relation to managerial entrenchment and empire-building theories, hedging against employment risk is more likely to be the primary factor for managers when deciding to conduct firm diversification. Consistent with the explanation of agency theory in relation to firm diversification, we also document that refocusing firms increase firm value after enacting the implied-contract exception. The incremental firm value likely reflects the improved efficiency of capital allocation across divisions, as we find that firms increase the efficiency of their capital allocation after the adoption of the law.

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来源期刊

Journal of Empirical Finance Multiple-

CiteScore

3.40

自引率

3.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Empirical Finance is a financial economics journal whose aim is to publish high quality articles in empirical finance. Empirical finance is interpreted broadly to include any type of empirical work in financial economics, financial econometrics, and also theoretical work with clear empirical implications, even when there is no empirical analysis. The Journal welcomes articles in all fields of finance, such as asset pricing, corporate finance, financial econometrics, banking, international finance, microstructure, behavioural finance, etc. The Editorial Team is willing to take risks on innovative research, controversial papers, and unusual approaches. We are also particularly interested in work produced by young scholars. The composition of the editorial board reflects such goals.