{"title":"高管薪酬的巨大不平等会损害公司业绩吗？","authors":"Richard Yiu-Ming Chung, Jed DeVaro, Scott Fung","doi":"10.1111/corg.12647","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div>\n \n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\n \n <p>Do large, within-firm executive pay differences hurt firm performance? Prior literature shows mixed results concerning the sign of the relationship between executive pay disparity and firm performance. This study evaluates that literature, clarifies what tournament theory predicts about the relationship, identifies methodological pitfalls and how to address them, and guides future scholarship in this area of considerable importance to firms and policy makers.</p>\n </section>\n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\n \n <p>We estimate the relationship using improved methodology and find evidence of an inverted-<i>U</i>-shaped relationship between the executive pay spread and firm performance. However, the peak of this inverted <i>U</i> occurs at such a high level of the executive pay spread that it is practically irrelevant in most firms. The inverted <i>U</i> is found using a market-based measure of firm performance, but not a returns-based measure (i.e., ROA).</p>\n </section>\n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\n \n <p>This study addresses the theoretical and empirical limitations of the prior literature, thereby providing more credible estimates of the relationship between pay disparity and firm performance. Tournament theory offers a unified framework that can explain an inverted-<i>U</i>-shaped relationship between the executive pay spread and firm performance.</p>\n </section>\n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\n \n <p>Our results should reduce public concerns that CEOs increase their own compensation to exorbitant levels, to the detriment of firm performance.</p>\n </section>\n </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"33 5","pages":"1251-1276"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5000,"publicationDate":"2025-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Do Big Inequalities in Executive Pay Hurt Firm Performance?\",\"authors\":\"Richard Yiu-Ming Chung, Jed DeVaro, Scott Fung\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/corg.12647\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div>\\n \\n \\n <section>\\n \\n <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\\n \\n <p>Do large, within-firm executive pay differences hurt firm performance? Prior literature shows mixed results concerning the sign of the relationship between executive pay disparity and firm performance. This study evaluates that literature, clarifies what tournament theory predicts about the relationship, identifies methodological pitfalls and how to address them, and guides future scholarship in this area of considerable importance to firms and policy makers.</p>\\n </section>\\n \\n <section>\\n \\n <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\\n \\n <p>We estimate the relationship using improved methodology and find evidence of an inverted-<i>U</i>-shaped relationship between the executive pay spread and firm performance. However, the peak of this inverted <i>U</i> occurs at such a high level of the executive pay spread that it is practically irrelevant in most firms. The inverted <i>U</i> is found using a market-based measure of firm performance, but not a returns-based measure (i.e., ROA).</p>\\n </section>\\n \\n <section>\\n \\n <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\\n \\n <p>This study addresses the theoretical and empirical limitations of the prior literature, thereby providing more credible estimates of the relationship between pay disparity and firm performance. Tournament theory offers a unified framework that can explain an inverted-<i>U</i>-shaped relationship between the executive pay spread and firm performance.</p>\\n </section>\\n \\n <section>\\n \\n <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\\n \\n <p>Our results should reduce public concerns that CEOs increase their own compensation to exorbitant levels, to the detriment of firm performance.</p>\\n </section>\\n </div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48209,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Corporate Governance-An International Review\",\"volume\":\"33 5\",\"pages\":\"1251-1276\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":5.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-02-27\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Corporate Governance-An International Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/corg.12647\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/corg.12647","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Do Big Inequalities in Executive Pay Hurt Firm Performance?
Research Question/Issue
Do large, within-firm executive pay differences hurt firm performance? Prior literature shows mixed results concerning the sign of the relationship between executive pay disparity and firm performance. This study evaluates that literature, clarifies what tournament theory predicts about the relationship, identifies methodological pitfalls and how to address them, and guides future scholarship in this area of considerable importance to firms and policy makers.
Research Findings/Insights
We estimate the relationship using improved methodology and find evidence of an inverted-U-shaped relationship between the executive pay spread and firm performance. However, the peak of this inverted U occurs at such a high level of the executive pay spread that it is practically irrelevant in most firms. The inverted U is found using a market-based measure of firm performance, but not a returns-based measure (i.e., ROA).
Theoretical/Academic Implications
This study addresses the theoretical and empirical limitations of the prior literature, thereby providing more credible estimates of the relationship between pay disparity and firm performance. Tournament theory offers a unified framework that can explain an inverted-U-shaped relationship between the executive pay spread and firm performance.
Practitioner/Policy Implications
Our results should reduce public concerns that CEOs increase their own compensation to exorbitant levels, to the detriment of firm performance.
期刊介绍：
The mission of Corporate Governance: An International Review is to publish cutting-edge international business research on the phenomena of comparative corporate governance throughout the global economy. Our ultimate goal is a rigorous and relevant global theory of corporate governance. We define corporate governance broadly as the exercise of power over corporate entities so as to increase the value provided to the organization"s various stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm. Because of this broad conceptualization, a wide variety of academic disciplines can contribute to our understanding.
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