Dennis B. Veltrop, Irene Mostert, Paula M. G. Dirks, Jakob de Haan
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In addition, when considering the combined moderating effect of TMT tenure and board tenure, we find that board-TMT cognitive conflict is most positively (negatively) associated with board advice giving when TMT tenure is low (high), while board tenure is high (low).</p>\n </section>\n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\n \n <p>Our work complements prior work by integrating insights from group research and resource dependence theory. It provides a nuanced view on the link between board-TMT cognitive conflict and board advice giving. We highlight that the way cognitive conflict translates into board advice depends not only on the TMT's receptiveness to board challenge but also on the board's in-depth understanding of organizational affairs.</p>\n </section>\n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\n \n <p>Our work points out that boards taking a critical stance may backfire if boards do not “measure up” to TMTs' organizational experience. We contest that longer-tenured boards are ill-equipped to provide critical advice and highlight the crucial role of TMT tenure therein. As such, policymakers and organizations should consider the combined impact of TMT tenure and board tenure when trying to stimulate that boards effectively challenge management.</p>\n </section>\n </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"33 5","pages":"1178-1202"},"PeriodicalIF":5.5000,"publicationDate":"2025-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12643","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"From Conflict to Counsel: The Interplay of Board-TMT Cognitive Conflict, TMT Tenure, and Board Tenure on Board Advice Giving\",\"authors\":\"Dennis B. Veltrop, Irene Mostert, Paula M. G. 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In addition, when considering the combined moderating effect of TMT tenure and board tenure, we find that board-TMT cognitive conflict is most positively (negatively) associated with board advice giving when TMT tenure is low (high), while board tenure is high (low).</p>\\n </section>\\n \\n <section>\\n \\n <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\\n \\n <p>Our work complements prior work by integrating insights from group research and resource dependence theory. It provides a nuanced view on the link between board-TMT cognitive conflict and board advice giving. 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From Conflict to Counsel: The Interplay of Board-TMT Cognitive Conflict, TMT Tenure, and Board Tenure on Board Advice Giving
Research Question/Issue
We recognize the collaborative nature of board advice giving and investigate (1) how the level of cognitive conflict between boards and top management teams (TMTs) is associated with board advice giving and (2) how this relation is shaped by TMT tenure and board tenure.
Research Findings/Insights
Using insights from a unique multi-source dataset from 285 board members of 102 Dutch financial firms, we find that TMT tenure and board tenure both moderate the relation between board-TMT cognitive conflict and board advice giving. In addition, when considering the combined moderating effect of TMT tenure and board tenure, we find that board-TMT cognitive conflict is most positively (negatively) associated with board advice giving when TMT tenure is low (high), while board tenure is high (low).
Theoretical/Academic Implications
Our work complements prior work by integrating insights from group research and resource dependence theory. It provides a nuanced view on the link between board-TMT cognitive conflict and board advice giving. We highlight that the way cognitive conflict translates into board advice depends not only on the TMT's receptiveness to board challenge but also on the board's in-depth understanding of organizational affairs.
Practitioner/Policy Implications
Our work points out that boards taking a critical stance may backfire if boards do not “measure up” to TMTs' organizational experience. We contest that longer-tenured boards are ill-equipped to provide critical advice and highlight the crucial role of TMT tenure therein. As such, policymakers and organizations should consider the combined impact of TMT tenure and board tenure when trying to stimulate that boards effectively challenge management.
期刊介绍：
The mission of Corporate Governance: An International Review is to publish cutting-edge international business research on the phenomena of comparative corporate governance throughout the global economy. Our ultimate goal is a rigorous and relevant global theory of corporate governance. We define corporate governance broadly as the exercise of power over corporate entities so as to increase the value provided to the organization"s various stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm. Because of this broad conceptualization, a wide variety of academic disciplines can contribute to our understanding.
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