Active Security Control for Switched Systems Under Deception and DoS Attacks Based on Two-Tier Stackelberg Game

This article delves into the security control challenges posed by networked switched systems (NSSs) in the face of deception attacks and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. It takes an active perspective and proposes an enhanced two-tier Stackelberg game approach to influence the actions of the deception attacker, controller, and DoS attacker. By formulating the cost functions for these three participants, it seeks to derive the optimal solution and the interplay between their respective optimal strategies. Meanwhile, two complicated situations are taken into account: The asynchronous behavior between the system and controller is caused by deception attacks tampering with switching signals; The open-loop operation of the system is caused by DoS attacks blocking the output of the controller. In the joint design of the two-tier multiattacker Stackelberg game approach and average dwell time technique, the system’s mean square exponential stability is guaranteed while revealing the quantitative relationship between the deception attack, DoS attack, and asynchronous switching behaviors. Finally, a simulation result of a switched RLC circuit confirms the validity of the obtained active security control methodology.