模拟四种租赁法政策的改造激励和分配效应:在德国监管背景下使用混凝土建筑和改造方案的模型分析

IF 6.6 2区 工程技术 Q1 CONSTRUCTION & BUILDING TECHNOLOGY
Leo Reutter , Bernadetta Winiewska
{"title":"模拟四种租赁法政策的改造激励和分配效应:在德国监管背景下使用混凝土建筑和改造方案的模型分析","authors":"Leo Reutter ,&nbsp;Bernadetta Winiewska","doi":"10.1016/j.enbuild.2025.115805","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>The primary landlord-tenant dilemma arising from rent control prevents landlords from recovering costs of energy-efficiency retrofits, which mainly benefit tenants if the landlord undertakes the retrofit. This requires tenancy law to allocate retrofit and energy costs adequately. Previous research discusses the dilemma generally or examines policy options without numeric estimations of their long-term effects. This paper addresses this research gap by conducting a thorough comparative quantitative analysis of several policy options. The study analyzes the impact of Germany’s current system and three reform options on landlords’ and tenants’ financial costs and benefits using simulations across various building sizes and retrofit ambitions. Investment costs exceed energy savings in 12 of the 15 retrofit projects examined. The discounted project payoff — the lifetime benefit of the retrofit compared to maintaining the status quo — ranges from −1.07 to 0.11 €<sub>2023</sub>/m<sup>2</sup>/month. The status quo system and one reform option almost always incentivize landlords to forego retrofits. Only two reform options consistently incentivize landlord investment, albeit at tenants’ expense. A sensitivity analysis shows these systems’ effectiveness is not affected by the details of German general tenancy law and local rent markets’ characteristics (rent levels and their inflation, valuation of energy efficiency). Designing landlords’ retrofit premia to depend on the technically estimated energy demand cost savings is especially promising as it incentivizes retrofits when profitable. Seven cases where a retrofit is profitable for the landlord but not from a project perspective are primarily due to the rebound effect. Under this system, landlords’ and tenants’ benefits from the retrofit, compared to continued maintenance, range from −0.28 to 0.42 and −1.10 to −0.02 €<sub>2023</sub>/m<sup>2</sup>/month, respectively.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11641,"journal":{"name":"Energy and Buildings","volume":"341 ","pages":"Article 115805"},"PeriodicalIF":6.6000,"publicationDate":"2025-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Simulating retrofit incentives and distributional effects of four tenancy law policies A model analysis using concrete buildings and retrofit options within the German regulatory context\",\"authors\":\"Leo Reutter ,&nbsp;Bernadetta Winiewska\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.enbuild.2025.115805\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>The primary landlord-tenant dilemma arising from rent control prevents landlords from recovering costs of energy-efficiency retrofits, which mainly benefit tenants if the landlord undertakes the retrofit. This requires tenancy law to allocate retrofit and energy costs adequately. Previous research discusses the dilemma generally or examines policy options without numeric estimations of their long-term effects. This paper addresses this research gap by conducting a thorough comparative quantitative analysis of several policy options. The study analyzes the impact of Germany’s current system and three reform options on landlords’ and tenants’ financial costs and benefits using simulations across various building sizes and retrofit ambitions. Investment costs exceed energy savings in 12 of the 15 retrofit projects examined. The discounted project payoff — the lifetime benefit of the retrofit compared to maintaining the status quo — ranges from −1.07 to 0.11 €<sub>2023</sub>/m<sup>2</sup>/month. The status quo system and one reform option almost always incentivize landlords to forego retrofits. Only two reform options consistently incentivize landlord investment, albeit at tenants’ expense. A sensitivity analysis shows these systems’ effectiveness is not affected by the details of German general tenancy law and local rent markets’ characteristics (rent levels and their inflation, valuation of energy efficiency). Designing landlords’ retrofit premia to depend on the technically estimated energy demand cost savings is especially promising as it incentivizes retrofits when profitable. Seven cases where a retrofit is profitable for the landlord but not from a project perspective are primarily due to the rebound effect. Under this system, landlords’ and tenants’ benefits from the retrofit, compared to continued maintenance, range from −0.28 to 0.42 and −1.10 to −0.02 €<sub>2023</sub>/m<sup>2</sup>/month, respectively.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":11641,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Energy and Buildings\",\"volume\":\"341 \",\"pages\":\"Article 115805\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":6.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-04-30\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Energy and Buildings\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"5\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378778825005353\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"工程技术\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"CONSTRUCTION & BUILDING TECHNOLOGY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Energy and Buildings","FirstCategoryId":"5","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378778825005353","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"工程技术","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"CONSTRUCTION & BUILDING TECHNOLOGY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

租金管制导致的主要房东与租客之间的困境,使房东无法收回节能改造的成本,而如果房东进行节能改造,主要受益者是租客。这就要求租赁法充分分配改造和能源成本。以前的研究一般地讨论了这一困境,或者在没有对其长期影响进行数值估计的情况下考察了政策选择。本文通过对几种政策选择进行全面的比较定量分析来解决这一研究缺口。该研究分析了德国现行制度的影响,以及三种改革方案对房东和租户的财务成本和收益的影响,采用了不同建筑尺寸和改造雄心的模拟。在调查的15个改造项目中,有12个项目的投资成本超过了节约的能源。贴现项目收益-与维持现状相比,改造的终身收益-范围为- 1.07至0.11€2023/m2/月。现有的系统和一个改革方案几乎总是激励房东放弃改造。只有两种改革方案能够持续激励房东投资,尽管是以租客为代价的。敏感性分析表明,这些系统的有效性不受德国一般租赁法和当地租金市场特征(租金水平及其通货膨胀、能源效率估值)的影响。根据技术上估计的能源需求成本节省来设计房东的改造费用特别有希望,因为它在有利可图时激励改造。在7个案例中,改造对房东来说是有利可图的,但从项目的角度来看,这主要是由于反弹效应。在该系统下,与持续维护相比,房东和租户从改造中获得的收益分别为- 0.28至0.42欧元/m2/月和- 1.10至- 0.02欧元/m2/月。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Simulating retrofit incentives and distributional effects of four tenancy law policies A model analysis using concrete buildings and retrofit options within the German regulatory context

Simulating retrofit incentives and distributional effects of four tenancy law policies A model analysis using concrete buildings and retrofit options within the German regulatory context
The primary landlord-tenant dilemma arising from rent control prevents landlords from recovering costs of energy-efficiency retrofits, which mainly benefit tenants if the landlord undertakes the retrofit. This requires tenancy law to allocate retrofit and energy costs adequately. Previous research discusses the dilemma generally or examines policy options without numeric estimations of their long-term effects. This paper addresses this research gap by conducting a thorough comparative quantitative analysis of several policy options. The study analyzes the impact of Germany’s current system and three reform options on landlords’ and tenants’ financial costs and benefits using simulations across various building sizes and retrofit ambitions. Investment costs exceed energy savings in 12 of the 15 retrofit projects examined. The discounted project payoff — the lifetime benefit of the retrofit compared to maintaining the status quo — ranges from −1.07 to 0.11 €2023/m2/month. The status quo system and one reform option almost always incentivize landlords to forego retrofits. Only two reform options consistently incentivize landlord investment, albeit at tenants’ expense. A sensitivity analysis shows these systems’ effectiveness is not affected by the details of German general tenancy law and local rent markets’ characteristics (rent levels and their inflation, valuation of energy efficiency). Designing landlords’ retrofit premia to depend on the technically estimated energy demand cost savings is especially promising as it incentivizes retrofits when profitable. Seven cases where a retrofit is profitable for the landlord but not from a project perspective are primarily due to the rebound effect. Under this system, landlords’ and tenants’ benefits from the retrofit, compared to continued maintenance, range from −0.28 to 0.42 and −1.10 to −0.02 €2023/m2/month, respectively.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
Energy and Buildings
Energy and Buildings 工程技术-工程:土木
CiteScore
12.70
自引率
11.90%
发文量
863
审稿时长
38 days
期刊介绍: An international journal devoted to investigations of energy use and efficiency in buildings Energy and Buildings is an international journal publishing articles with explicit links to energy use in buildings. The aim is to present new research results, and new proven practice aimed at reducing the energy needs of a building and improving indoor environment quality.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信