MPC-based detection and resilience against bounded and unbounded FDI cyberattacks in isolated AC microgrid with battery-source DERs

In microgrid cybersecurity, the detection and resilience scheme against False Data Injection (FDI) cyberattacks is designed to handle either a bounded or unbounded type attack. Thus, the proposed control scheme is designed on reduced-ordered Model Predictive Control (MPC), where the collaboration of Kalman estimation and cost function can identify both kinds of FDI attacks targeted on the actuator and sensors of the Inverter-based Distributed Energy Resources (DERs). The MPC provides quick recovery and is unaffected by variable load and battery energy dissimilarity. However, after resiliency from FDI attacks, a conventional consensus with power-frequency droop characteristics (P-f) usually suffers from frequency fluctuation and power-sharing error. Consequently, the proposed secondary control system is designed on a three consensus coordination, where frequency coordination is only used to maintain synchronism, voltage angle coordination is designed for accurate active power sharing with State-of-Charge (SoC) balancing and as usual, the voltage coordination is for reactive power sharing among battery source voltage controlled DERs. The Lyapunov function on coordination schemes is used to analyze the stability and constraints. The performance includes MATLAB simulation of an AC microgrid built on a CIGRE European LV testbed. However, experimental validation is based on a cyber-physical system built with a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) having a Common Industrial Protocol (CIP) for communication.