Julie Y L Chow, Kelly G Garner, Daniel Pearson, James Heber, Mike E Le Pelley
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To address this, we examined the distinct impact of two information sources that modulate potential for learning: explicit instruction versus ongoing experience of prediction error in reward feedback. Experiment 1 demonstrated that providing explicit instructions-and hence negating the need for further learning-did not reduce the magnitude of the UMAC effect, indicating that UMAC does not reflect attention for learning as a strategic approach for determining the task state. On the other hand, Experiment 2 showed that instructions alone were insufficient to generate a UMAC effect in the absence of reward feedback, suggesting that the impact of uncertainty on rapid attentional prioritization is driven by direct experience of prediction error. Taken together, these findings point to two possibilities: UMAC may reflect attention for learning operating at an implicit level or may evince an attentional system that is configured for rapid detection of sources of experienced uncertainty so that subsequent behavior can be tailored appropriately. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
先前的研究表明,注意力优先级是由先前的奖励不确定性经验塑造的:注意力更有可能被与可变(不确定)奖励相关的刺激所捕获,而不是提供有关可用奖励的诊断信息的刺激。这一发现值得注意,因为它违背了认知是为了减少不确定性,从而减少惊喜的原则。在这里,我们研究了这种不确定性调制的注意捕获(UMAC)模式是否反映了一个学习的注意过程,在这个过程中,不确定性相关的刺激被优先考虑,试图了解它们的真实预测状态。为了解决这个问题,我们研究了调节学习潜能的两种信息源的不同影响:显性指导与奖励反馈中预测错误的持续经验。实验1表明,提供明确的指示——从而否定进一步学习的需要——并没有降低UMAC效应的大小,这表明UMAC并没有反映学习注意力作为确定任务状态的策略方法。另一方面,实验2表明,在没有奖励反馈的情况下,指令本身不足以产生UMAC效应,这表明不确定性对快速注意优先化的影响是由预测误差的直接经验驱动的。综上所述,这些发现指出了两种可能性:UMAC可能反映了在内隐水平上对学习操作的注意,或者可能表明了一种注意系统,该系统被配置为快速检测经验不确定性的来源,从而可以适当地调整后续行为。(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA,版权所有)。
Effects of instructed and experienced uncertainty on attentional priority.
Previous research has demonstrated that attentional prioritization is shaped by prior experience of reward uncertainty: Attention is more likely to be captured by a stimulus associated with a variable (uncertain) reward than a stimulus that provides diagnostic information about available reward. This finding is noteworthy, because it runs counter to the principle that cognition is motivated to reduce uncertainty and hence surprise. Here we investigated whether this pattern of uncertainty-modulated attentional capture (UMAC) reflects a process of attention for learning, wherein uncertainty-related stimuli are prioritized in an attempt to learn about their true predictive status. To address this, we examined the distinct impact of two information sources that modulate potential for learning: explicit instruction versus ongoing experience of prediction error in reward feedback. Experiment 1 demonstrated that providing explicit instructions-and hence negating the need for further learning-did not reduce the magnitude of the UMAC effect, indicating that UMAC does not reflect attention for learning as a strategic approach for determining the task state. On the other hand, Experiment 2 showed that instructions alone were insufficient to generate a UMAC effect in the absence of reward feedback, suggesting that the impact of uncertainty on rapid attentional prioritization is driven by direct experience of prediction error. Taken together, these findings point to two possibilities: UMAC may reflect attention for learning operating at an implicit level or may evince an attentional system that is configured for rapid detection of sources of experienced uncertainty so that subsequent behavior can be tailored appropriately. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition publishes studies on perception, control of action, perceptual aspects of language processing, and related cognitive processes.