{"title":"ESG 评级与股息变化:非财务机构覆盖的启动证据","authors":"Albert Tsang, Yujie Wang, Yi Xiang, Li Yu","doi":"10.1111/corg.12615","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Research Question/IssueThis paper examines whether the coverage of nonfinancial rating (NFR) agencies affects corporate dividend policy.Research Findings/InsightsWe argue that dividend payout may decrease (increase) if NFR agencies provide information that reduces (increases) shareholder–manager agency (shareholder–stakeholder) conflict. We find that the coverage by an NFR agency is followed by an increase in dividends. This result is more pronounced for firms with more influential shareholders, poorer financial performance, and greater ESG commitment. We corroborate our findings using the acquisitions of NFR agencies and the expansion of NFR agencies' coverage as two main exogenous shocks. Lastly, our results hold for both US firms and non‐US firms.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsCollectively, this paper supports that the ESG ratings made available by NFR rating agencies following their rating coverage increase shareholder–stakeholder conflict to a greater extent than its effect on reducing shareholder–managers agency conflict.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsOur paper delivers critical insights to regulators striving to comprehend the functions of NFR agencies within the capital market more effectively. Such an understanding can further support their efforts to formulate new guidelines suitable for the burgeoning and swiftly evolving industry of NFR agencies.","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":4.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"ESG Ratings and Dividend Changes: Evidence From the Initiation of Nonfinancial Agency Coverage\",\"authors\":\"Albert Tsang, Yujie Wang, Yi Xiang, Li Yu\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/corg.12615\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Research Question/IssueThis paper examines whether the coverage of nonfinancial rating (NFR) agencies affects corporate dividend policy.Research Findings/InsightsWe argue that dividend payout may decrease (increase) if NFR agencies provide information that reduces (increases) shareholder–manager agency (shareholder–stakeholder) conflict. We find that the coverage by an NFR agency is followed by an increase in dividends. This result is more pronounced for firms with more influential shareholders, poorer financial performance, and greater ESG commitment. We corroborate our findings using the acquisitions of NFR agencies and the expansion of NFR agencies' coverage as two main exogenous shocks. Lastly, our results hold for both US firms and non‐US firms.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsCollectively, this paper supports that the ESG ratings made available by NFR rating agencies following their rating coverage increase shareholder–stakeholder conflict to a greater extent than its effect on reducing shareholder–managers agency conflict.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsOur paper delivers critical insights to regulators striving to comprehend the functions of NFR agencies within the capital market more effectively. Such an understanding can further support their efforts to formulate new guidelines suitable for the burgeoning and swiftly evolving industry of NFR agencies.\",\"PeriodicalId\":48209,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Corporate Governance-An International Review\",\"volume\":\"32 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-13\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Corporate Governance-An International Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12615\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12615","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
ESG Ratings and Dividend Changes: Evidence From the Initiation of Nonfinancial Agency Coverage
Research Question/IssueThis paper examines whether the coverage of nonfinancial rating (NFR) agencies affects corporate dividend policy.Research Findings/InsightsWe argue that dividend payout may decrease (increase) if NFR agencies provide information that reduces (increases) shareholder–manager agency (shareholder–stakeholder) conflict. We find that the coverage by an NFR agency is followed by an increase in dividends. This result is more pronounced for firms with more influential shareholders, poorer financial performance, and greater ESG commitment. We corroborate our findings using the acquisitions of NFR agencies and the expansion of NFR agencies' coverage as two main exogenous shocks. Lastly, our results hold for both US firms and non‐US firms.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsCollectively, this paper supports that the ESG ratings made available by NFR rating agencies following their rating coverage increase shareholder–stakeholder conflict to a greater extent than its effect on reducing shareholder–managers agency conflict.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsOur paper delivers critical insights to regulators striving to comprehend the functions of NFR agencies within the capital market more effectively. Such an understanding can further support their efforts to formulate new guidelines suitable for the burgeoning and swiftly evolving industry of NFR agencies.
期刊介绍:
The mission of Corporate Governance: An International Review is to publish cutting-edge international business research on the phenomena of comparative corporate governance throughout the global economy. Our ultimate goal is a rigorous and relevant global theory of corporate governance. We define corporate governance broadly as the exercise of power over corporate entities so as to increase the value provided to the organization"s various stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm. Because of this broad conceptualization, a wide variety of academic disciplines can contribute to our understanding.