信号理论:理论现状与未来

IF 9.3 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Brian L. Connelly, S. Trevis Certo, Christopher R. Reutzel, Mark R. DesJardine, Yi Shi Zhou
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引用次数: 0

摘要

信号理论与决策和交流有关。它描述了这样一种情景:信号发出者发出可观察到的信号,这些信号携带着关于不可观察品质的可信信息。当决策者拥有不完整或不完善的信息时,信号可以帮助他们做出更好的决策。不过,信号的威力在于其成本,对于低质量的信号发出者来说,最佳信号的成本很高,而对于高质量的信号发出者来说,成本较低。鉴于这些观点在组织科学中的核心地位,我们对使用信号理论来帮助解释组织内部和组织之间发生的现象的管理研究进行了审查。我们的综述提请大家注意信号理论家是如何为信号传递过程引入重要的复杂性、揭示信号传递的理论边界条件、描述信号传递系统中的新行为主体,以及在涉及广泛组织利益相关者的一系列研究情境中展示应用信号传递理论理解行为的新方法的。我们还就学者如何在应用该理论时考虑成本、如何在更多组织环境中扩展该理论以及如何对该理论的主要概念进行抽象扩展等问题提出了一些想法。我们的目的是为研究人员提供有关信号传递理论现状的全景视角,并激励他们进一步发展,从而使我们在下一个十年能够共同推进信号传递理论的发展,就像它在上一个十年所取得的进步一样。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Signaling Theory: State of the Theory and Its Future
Signaling theory is about decision-making and communication. It describes scenarios where signalers send observable signals that carry credible information about unobservable qualities. When decision-makers have incomplete or imperfect information, signals can help them make better decisions. The power of a signal, though, lies in its cost, with the best signals being highly costly for low-quality signalers and less costly for high-quality signalers. Given the centrality of these ideas in the organizational sciences, we examine management studies that use signaling theory to help explain phenomena that occur within and among organizations. Our review draws attention to how signaling theorists have introduced important complexities to the signaling process, uncovered theoretical boundary conditions of signaling, described new actors within signaling systems, and demonstrated novel ways to apply signaling theory to understand behavior in an array of research contexts involving a wide range of organizational stakeholders. We also offer ideas about how scholars can account for costs when they apply the theory, extend the theory in more organizational settings, and create abstract extensions of the theory’s major concepts. Our intent is to provide researchers with a panoramic perspective on the state of signaling theory and inspire further development so that we can collectively advance signaling theory as much in the next decade as it has advanced in the last.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
22.40
自引率
5.20%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Journal of Management (JOM) aims to publish rigorous empirical and theoretical research articles that significantly contribute to the field of management. It is particularly interested in papers that have a strong impact on the overall management discipline. JOM also encourages the submission of novel ideas and fresh perspectives on existing research. The journal covers a wide range of areas, including business strategy and policy, organizational behavior, human resource management, organizational theory, entrepreneurship, and research methods. It provides a platform for scholars to present their work on these topics and fosters intellectual discussion and exchange in these areas.
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