负利率政策与银行风险承担:寻求收益率还是去杠杆化?

Wenjin Tang, Weichang Chen, Xiaorui Ma, Chengbo Fu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

自 2012 年以来,许多中央银行都实施了负利率政策(NIRPs)。关于负利率政策的有效性,学术界出现了两种截然相反的假设:"去杠杆效应 "和 "寻求收益效应"。长期使用 NIRPs 为重新审视利率与银行风险承担之间的关系提供了一个难得的重要环境。我们利用 23 个国家(19 个欧元区国家以及日本、丹麦、瑞典和瑞士)从 2007 年到 2020 年的商业银行数据进行了实证分析。结果表明,政策利率下调 1%,银行的风险承担就会减少 4.9%。这一结果在实施 NIRPs 后更为明显。我们的研究结果支持了 NIRPs 下的 "去杠杆化效应"。我们接下来的研究表明,收入更多元化、规模更小或竞争环境更激烈的银行的 "去杠杆化效应 "更大。这些研究结果有助于使围绕 NIRPs 有效性的争论更加清晰,并支持中央银行在不同经济形势下做出更有效的货币政策决策。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Negative interest rate policy and bank risk‐taking: Search for yield or de‐leverage?
Since 2012, many central banks have implemented negative interest rate policies (NIRPs). While two opposing hypotheses about the effectiveness of NIRPs have emerged in the academic: the “de‐leverage effect” and the “search‐for‐yield effect.” The long‐term use of NIRPs provides a rare and important setting to re‐examine the relationship between interest rates and bank risk‐taking. We conduct an empirical analysis by using commercial banks' data from 2007 to 2020 for 23 countries (19 eurozone countries plus Japan, Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland), which had adopted NIRPs. It indicates that 1% reduction in the policy rate would reduce bank risk‐taking by 4.9%. This result is stronger after the NIRPs implemented. Our results support the “de‐leverage effect” under NIRPs. We next show that the “de‐leverage effect” is greater for banks with more diversified income, smaller size or under more competitive environment. The findings help to make the debates around NIRPs effectiveness clearer as well as support for the central banks to make more effective monetary policy decisions in different economic situations.
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