从宏观角度看用于 WSN 入侵检测的 PPSO 和贝叶斯博弈

IF 5 2区 计算机科学 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Ning Liu, Shangkun Liu, Wei-Min Zheng
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引用次数: 0

摘要

无线传感器网络的安全性是当前研究的热门话题。博弈论可以为攻防对抗中的攻防双方提供最优选择策略。针对以往博弈模型通用性差的问题,我们提出了一种广义贝叶斯博弈模型来分析无线传感器网络中的节点入侵检测。由于传统方法很难求解贝叶斯博弈的纳什均衡,因此我们提出了一种并行粒子群优化方法来求解贝叶斯博弈的纳什均衡,并分析防御方的最优行动。仿真结果表明,与其他启发式算法相比,并行粒子群优化算法更具优势。该算法被证明能有效地找到最优防御策略。通过仿真实验分析了节点的检测率和误报率对防御者收益的影响。仿真实验表明,防御者的收益随着误报率的增加而减少,随着检测率的降低而减少。利用启发式算法求解贝叶斯博弈的纳什均衡为攻防对抗的研究提供了一种新方法。通过博弈模型预测攻防双方的行动,可以为防御方提供主动防御的思路。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

PPSO and Bayesian game for intrusion detection in WSN from a macro perspective

PPSO and Bayesian game for intrusion detection in WSN from a macro perspective

The security of wireless sensor networks is a hot topic in current research. Game theory can provide the optimal selection strategy for attackers and defenders in the attack-defense confrontation. Aiming at the problem of poor generality of previous game models, we propose a generalized Bayesian game model to analyze the intrusion detection of nodes in wireless sensor networks. Because it is difficult to solve the Nash equilibrium of the Bayesian game by the traditional method, a parallel particle swarm optimization is proposed to solve the Nash equilibrium of the Bayesian game and analyze the optimal action of the defender. The simulation results show the superiority of the parallel particle swarm optimization compared with other heuristic algorithms. This algorithm is proved to be effective in finding optimal defense strategy. The influence of the detection rate and false alarm rate of nodes on the profit of defender is analyzed by simulation experiments. Simulation experiments show that the profit of defender decreases as false alarm rate increases and decreases as detection rate decreases. Using heuristic algorithm to solve Nash equilibrium of Bayesian game provides a new method for the research of attack-defense confrontation. Predicting the actions of attacker and defender through the game model can provide ideas for the defender to take active defense.

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来源期刊
Complex & Intelligent Systems
Complex & Intelligent Systems COMPUTER SCIENCE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE-
CiteScore
9.60
自引率
10.30%
发文量
297
期刊介绍: Complex & Intelligent Systems aims to provide a forum for presenting and discussing novel approaches, tools and techniques meant for attaining a cross-fertilization between the broad fields of complex systems, computational simulation, and intelligent analytics and visualization. The transdisciplinary research that the journal focuses on will expand the boundaries of our understanding by investigating the principles and processes that underlie many of the most profound problems facing society today.
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