你的理由必须打动你吗？

IF 1.1 1区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-07-20 DOI:10.1007/s11098-024-02186-8

N. L. Engel-Hawbecker

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引用次数: 0

摘要

许多作者假定，我们在理性上必须为任何公认的理由所感动。事实证明，无论是在一般情况下，还是在任何非微不足道的限制条件下，这一假设即使不是错误的，也是不合理的。即使其最可信的形式也与排除性理由的可能性相矛盾。有些人怀疑后者的可能性。但这些怀疑也被证明是毫无根据的，排除性理由在规范理论中的普遍作用也得到了辩护。

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Must your reasons move you?

Many authors assume that we are rationally required to be somewhat moved by any recognized reason. This assumption turns out to be unjustified if not false, both in general and under any non-trivial restriction. Even its most plausible forms are contradicted by the possibility of exclusionary reasons. Some have doubted the latter’s possibility. But these doubts are also shown to be unfounded, and exclusionary reasons’ pervasive role in normative theorizing is defended.

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来源期刊

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

2.60

自引率

7.70%

发文量

127

期刊介绍： Philosophical Studies was founded in 1950 by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars to provide a periodical dedicated to work in analytic philosophy. The journal remains devoted to the publication of papers in exclusively analytic philosophy. Papers applying formal techniques to philosophical problems are welcome. The principal aim is to publish articles that are models of clarity and precision in dealing with significant philosophical issues. It is intended that readers of the journal will be kept abreast of the central issues and problems of contemporary analytic philosophy. Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.