自由主义、决策和不归点

IF 1.1 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Alfred R. Mele
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文提出了对标准自由主义观点的挑战,这一挑战基于一个想象中的神经科学发现,这一发现与满足主流自由决策的标准自由主义要求不相容,本文还探讨了自由主义对这一发现的潜在回应。有争议的要求可表述如下:在主流情况下,只有在考虑到过去和自然法则的情况下,代理人能够在 t 点之前有意做其他事情而不是决定 A,代理人才能在 t 点自由决定 A。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Libertarianism, decision-making, and a point of no return

This paper develops a challenge to standard libertarian views that is based on an imagined neuroscientificdiscovery that is incompatible with satisfaction of a standard libertarian requirement for mainstream free decision making, and it explores potential libertarian responses to this discovery. The requirement at issue may beformulated as follows: In mainstream cases, an agent freely decided at t to A only if, given the past and the laws of nature, the agent was able right up to t to do something else intentionally at t than decide to A. The imagined discovery is about a point of no return for the making of any particular decision in a mainstream scenario.

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来源期刊
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
7.70%
发文量
127
期刊介绍: Philosophical Studies was founded in 1950 by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars to provide a periodical dedicated to work in analytic philosophy. The journal remains devoted to the publication of papers in exclusively analytic philosophy. Papers applying formal techniques to philosophical problems are welcome. The principal aim is to publish articles that are models of clarity and precision in dealing with significant philosophical issues. It is intended that readers of the journal will be kept abreast of the central issues and problems of contemporary analytic philosophy. Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.
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