埃及学与狂热

IF 1.1 1区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Pub Date : 2024-06-21 DOI:10.1007/s11098-024-02180-0

Hayden Wilkinson

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引用次数: 0

摘要

各种决策理论都有一个令人不安的含义。它们暗示，对于任何有限的价值量来说，最好是用全部赌注来换取某个更大价值的微乎其微的概率。尽管这种狂热可能与直觉相悖，但它似乎有令人信服的独立论据。在本文中，我考虑的可能是表面上最有说服力的论据：埃及学论据（类似于人口伦理学中的埃及学论据）。我表明，尽管罗素（Noûs，2023 年）和古德赛尔（Analysis 81（3）：420-426，2021 年）最近提出了反对意见，但该论证的前提是合理的，是可以辩护的，论证本身仍然令人信服。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

Egyptology and fanaticism

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Egyptology and fanaticism

Various decision theories share a troubling implication. They imply that, for any finite amount of value, it would be better to wager it all for a vanishingly small probability of some greater value. Counterintuitive as it might be, this fanaticism has seemingly compelling independent arguments in its favour. In this paper, I consider perhaps the most prima facie compelling such argument: an Egyptology argument (an analogue of the Egyptology argument from population ethics). I show that, despite recent objections from Russell (Noûs, 2023) and Goodsell (Analysis 81(3):420–426, 2021), the argument’s premises can be justified and defended, and the argument itself remains compelling.

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来源期刊

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

2.60

自引率

7.70%

发文量

127

期刊介绍： Philosophical Studies was founded in 1950 by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars to provide a periodical dedicated to work in analytic philosophy. The journal remains devoted to the publication of papers in exclusively analytic philosophy. Papers applying formal techniques to philosophical problems are welcome. The principal aim is to publish articles that are models of clarity and precision in dealing with significant philosophical issues. It is intended that readers of the journal will be kept abreast of the central issues and problems of contemporary analytic philosophy. Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.