补偿受益人

IF 1.1 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Linda Eggert
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文阐明了纠正义务的一个通常被掩盖的理由:作为'较小的恶'而被证明合理的伤害。较小的恶性伤害不是道德上全面禁止的行为的结果,而是为防止更大伤害而允许实施的行为的结果。本文认为,根据较小恶的理由行事(尤其是在军事救援行动中)的意外副作用所造成的伤害可能会引起赔偿要求,即使(1)造成有关伤害的军事行为是以较小恶为理由的,以及(2)有关受害者的情况并没有因此而恶化;他们的生存甚至可能归功于救援行为。本文为三种主张辩护。首先,与其他情况相比,有害的营救行为会使受害者的境况更好,但这并不排除要求对作为副作用而遭受的伤害进行赔偿的可能性。其次,为补偿性正义的目的确定相关的反事实有时是一个规定性的问题,而不是一个描述性的问题。在某些情况下,我们必须考虑行为人本应做什么,而不是依靠经验来推测如果伤害没有发生会怎样。最后,赔偿义务并不一定要由造成损害的人来承担。在某些情况下允许侵犯权利并不意味着不需要赔偿,而只是赔偿义务不一定落在权利侵犯者身上。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Compensating beneficiaries

This paper illuminates a typically obscured ground for rectificatory obligations: harms justified as ‘lesser evils.’ Lesser-evil harms are not the result of overall morally prohibited acts but of acts permissibly carried out to prevent significantly greater harm. The paper argues that harms caused as unintended side effects of acting on lesser-evil justifications, notably in military rescue operations, may give rise to claims to compensation, even if (1) the military acts that caused the harms in question were justified on lesser-evil grounds and (2) the victims in question are no worse off as a result; they may even owe their survival to the act of rescue. The paper defends three claims. First, being better off as a result of a harmful rescue than one would otherwise have been does not preclude claims to be compensated for harms suffered as a side effect. Second, identifying the relevant counterfactual for purposes of compensatory justice is sometimes a prescriptive, rather than a descriptive, matter. Rather than relying on empirical speculations about what would have happened had a harm not occurred, we must, in certain cases, consider what agents ought to have done. Finally, duties of compensation need not fall on those who caused the to-be-compensated harms. That infringing rights is permissible in certain cases does not imply that no compensation is owed, but merely that it is not necessarily rights-infringers on whom duties of compensation fall.

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来源期刊
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
7.70%
发文量
127
期刊介绍: Philosophical Studies was founded in 1950 by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars to provide a periodical dedicated to work in analytic philosophy. The journal remains devoted to the publication of papers in exclusively analytic philosophy. Papers applying formal techniques to philosophical problems are welcome. The principal aim is to publish articles that are models of clarity and precision in dealing with significant philosophical issues. It is intended that readers of the journal will be kept abreast of the central issues and problems of contemporary analytic philosophy. Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.
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