对强大知识的稳定接受

IF 1.1 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Peter Hawke
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引用次数: 0

摘要

根据嵌入了认识论(不)可能性主张的普通知识描述的令人费解的行为,我们初步得出结论,共同认可(i)认识论语言的不受约束的经典逻辑,(ii)知识归属的一般真实性,以及(iii)直观的 "负透明度 "论断(该论断将关于简单否定的 "可能 "主张的知识简化为没有模态内容的认识论主张)是站不住脚的。我们提出了一种策略性权衡:保留真实性和(广义的)负透明性,同时放弃倒置的普遍有效性。我们批判了将真实性纳入领域语义学的各种方法,这是一个捕捉负透明度的典型 "信息敏感 "框架,更广泛地说,它捕捉了带有认识模态的句子的非经典行为。然后,我们提出了一种新颖的信息敏感语义,它成功地执行了我们所偏爱的策略:稳定接受语义,用一个知识算子扩展了基于双边状态的虚无认识模态语义,这个知识算子的灵感来源于知识的不可行性理论(definasibility theory of knowledge)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Stable acceptance for mighty knowledge

Stable acceptance for mighty knowledge

Drawing on the puzzling behavior of ordinary knowledge ascriptions that embed an epistemic (im)possibility claim, we tentatively conclude that it is untenable to jointly endorse (i) an unfettered classical logic for epistemic language, (ii) the general veridicality of knowledge ascription, and (iii) an intuitive ‘negative transparency’ thesis that reduces knowledge of a simple negated ‘might’ claim to an epistemic claim without modal content. We motivate a strategic trade-off: preserve veridicality and (generalized) negative transparency, while abandoning the general validity of contraposition. We criticize various approaches to incorporating veridicality into domain semantics, a paradigmatic ‘information-sensitive’ framework for capturing negative transparency and, more generally, the non-classical behavior of sentences with epistemic modals. We then present a novel information-sensitive semantics that successfully executes our favored strategy: stable acceptance semantics, extending a vanilla bilateral state-based semantics for epistemic modals with a knowledge operator loosely inspired by the defeasibility theory of knowledge.

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来源期刊
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
7.70%
发文量
127
期刊介绍: Philosophical Studies was founded in 1950 by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars to provide a periodical dedicated to work in analytic philosophy. The journal remains devoted to the publication of papers in exclusively analytic philosophy. Papers applying formal techniques to philosophical problems are welcome. The principal aim is to publish articles that are models of clarity and precision in dealing with significant philosophical issues. It is intended that readers of the journal will be kept abreast of the central issues and problems of contemporary analytic philosophy. Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.
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