增选独立董事与公司的环境绩效

IF 4.6 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Asif Saeed, Aitzaz Ahsan Alias Sarang, Asad Ali Rind
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引用次数: 0

摘要

研究问题考虑到不断升级的环境问题以及董事会成员在影响公司战略决策方面的重要作用,我们对增选独立董事与公司环境绩效之间的关系进行了研究。研究结果/见解通过对 2002 年至 2018 年的美国公司进行研究,我们发现增选独立董事与公司环境绩效之间存在显著的负相关关系。我们的研究结果表明,虽然机构所有权和首席执行官的权力加剧了这种负相关关系,但强有力的公司治理减轻了增选独立董事对环境绩效的负面影响。横截面结果显示,这种关系在首席执行官年轻、首席执行官为男性且首席执行官薪酬较低的公司中尤为明显。此外,这种关系在会议次数较少、董事人数较多且薪酬较高的董事会中也很普遍,这表明增选的独立董事在监督方面做出了妥协。理论/学术启示从代理理论和友好董事会理论中得出了合理的理论依据,我们的统计分析支持了友好董事会理论的学术立场。增选独立董事对公司环境绩效的负面影响对独立董事在解决环境工作中的代理问题方面的作用提出了挑战,暗示着与传统代理理论预期的背离。我们的研究结果对《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》(SOX)强调增加外部董事人数提出了质疑,因为该法案假定独立董事会成员会严格监督高管。这种立法在很大程度上是以独立董事会成员严格监督高管为前提的。然而,我们的研究结果表明,并非所有的独立董事都是严格的监督者,当增选的独立董事较多时,环境绩效较低就证明了这一点。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Co‐opted Independent Directors and Firms' Environmental Performance
Research Question/IssueConsidering escalating environmental concerns and the important role of board members in shaping strategic corporate decisions, we investigate the relationship between co‐opted independent directors and firms' environmental performance.Research Findings/InsightsExamining US firms from 2002 to 2018, we document a significant negative relationship between co‐opted independent directors and firm environmental performance. Our findings show that while institutional ownership and CEO power exacerbate the negative association, strong corporate governance mitigates this negative impact of co‐opted independent directors on environmental performance. The cross‐sectional results show that the relationship is pronounced in firms with young CEOs, male CEOs, and low CEO compensation. Further, the relationship is also prevalent in boards with fewer meetings, high multiple directors, and higher compensation, indicating a monitoring compromise by independent co‐opted directors.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsReasonable theoretical arguments are drawn from agency theory and the theory of friendly boards, and our statistical analysis supports the academic position of the theory of friendly boards. The negative effect of independent co‐opted directors on firm environmental performance challenges the role of independent directors in addressing agency issues in environmental efforts, hinting at a departure from conventional agency theory expectations.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsTo improve environmental performance, firms should reconsider their board structures, acknowledging the potential drawbacks of co‐opted independent directors. Our findings challenge the Sarbanes–Oxley Act's (SOX) emphasis on increasing the number of outside directors, which assumes independent board members will rigorously oversee executives. Such legislation is greatly based on the premise that independent board members strictly monitor executives. However, our findings indicate that not all independent directors are strict monitors, as demonstrated by lower environmental performance when there are more co‐opted independent directors.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.00
自引率
11.30%
发文量
79
期刊介绍: The mission of Corporate Governance: An International Review is to publish cutting-edge international business research on the phenomena of comparative corporate governance throughout the global economy. Our ultimate goal is a rigorous and relevant global theory of corporate governance. We define corporate governance broadly as the exercise of power over corporate entities so as to increase the value provided to the organization"s various stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm. Because of this broad conceptualization, a wide variety of academic disciplines can contribute to our understanding.
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