通过终止条款治理战略联盟:保障与激励、灵活性与承诺

IF 9.3 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Marvin Hanisch
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引用次数: 0

摘要

终止条款在联盟中建立了重要的治理机制,通过提供退出(表现不佳的)伙伴关系的灵活性,提供了必要的保障和激励。然而,这些条款也可能破坏承诺和连续性,从而助长不信任和不稳定。我们认为,终止条款背后的动机在于需要解决联盟范围扩大、预付款增加和技术不确定性带来的保障和灵活性问题。相反,具有强烈关系承诺和社会嵌入性(源于先前和间接联系)的联盟往往会省略终止条款。通过对 1,576 份生物制药联盟合同的分析,我们仔细研究了各种有条件和无条件的终止权,以及合作伙伴的具体分配情况。除其他研究结果外,我们还观察到,广泛的联盟范围与专利质疑终止权、缺乏合理努力终止权、分配给提供技术专长的研发(R&D)公司的特定国家终止权,以及赞助联盟的客户公司为方便起见的终止权之间存在正相关。较大的单边预付款增加了客户公司因缺乏合理努力和方便而获得终止权的可能性。较高的技术不确定性与客户或研发公司因便利而获得终止权有关。相反,先前的联系与客户公司因便利而获得的终止权呈负相关,而间接联系则与研发公司因便利和特定国家而获得的终止权呈负相关。从概念上讲,我们的研究强调了终止条款作为弹性治理机制的相关性,它使合作伙伴能够适应合同后的干扰。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Strategic Alliance Governance Through Termination Provisions: Safeguard and Incentive, Flexibility and Commitment
Termination provisions establish vital governance mechanisms in alliances, offering essential safeguards and incentives by providing the flexibility to exit (underperforming) partnerships. However, they can also foster distrust and instability by potentially undermining commitment and continuity. We argue that the motivation behind termination provisions lies in the need to address safeguarding and flexibility concerns arising from increases in alliance scope, upfront payments, and technological uncertainty. Conversely, alliances with strong relational commitment and social embeddedness stemming from prior and indirect ties tend to omit termination provisions. Drawing on an analysis of 1,576 biopharmaceutical alliance contracts, we scrutinize various conditional and unconditional termination rights, along with their partner-specific allocations. Among other findings, we observe a positive association between broad alliance scope and termination rights for patent challenge, for lack of reasonable effort, and for specific countries assigned to the research and development (R&D) firm contributing technological expertise and, furthermore, termination rights for convenience for the client firm sponsoring the alliance. Larger unilateral upfront payments increase the likelihood that the client firm receives termination rights for lack of reasonable effort and for convenience. Higher technological uncertainty is associated with termination rights for convenience for the client or R&D firm. In contrast, prior ties negatively correlate with termination rights for convenience for the client firm, while indirect ties show a negative association with termination rights for convenience and specific countries for the R&D firm. Conceptually, our study highlights the relevance of termination provisions as elastic governance mechanisms that enable partners to accommodate postcontractual disturbances.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
22.40
自引率
5.20%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Journal of Management (JOM) aims to publish rigorous empirical and theoretical research articles that significantly contribute to the field of management. It is particularly interested in papers that have a strong impact on the overall management discipline. JOM also encourages the submission of novel ideas and fresh perspectives on existing research. The journal covers a wide range of areas, including business strategy and policy, organizational behavior, human resource management, organizational theory, entrepreneurship, and research methods. It provides a platform for scholars to present their work on these topics and fosters intellectual discussion and exchange in these areas.
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