{"title":"反对奇点假说","authors":"David Thorstad","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02143-5","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>The <i>singularity hypothesis</i> is a hypothesis about the future of artificial intelligence on which self-improving artificial agents will quickly become orders of magnitude more intelligent than the average human. Despite the ambitiousness of its claims, the singularity hypothesis has been defended at length by leading philosophers and artificial intelligence researchers. In this paper, I argue that the singularity hypothesis rests on undersupported growth assumptions. I show how leading philosophical defenses of the singularity hypothesis fail to overcome the case for skepticism. I conclude by drawing out philosophical and policy implications of this discussion.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Against the singularity hypothesis\",\"authors\":\"David Thorstad\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s11098-024-02143-5\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>The <i>singularity hypothesis</i> is a hypothesis about the future of artificial intelligence on which self-improving artificial agents will quickly become orders of magnitude more intelligent than the average human. Despite the ambitiousness of its claims, the singularity hypothesis has been defended at length by leading philosophers and artificial intelligence researchers. In this paper, I argue that the singularity hypothesis rests on undersupported growth assumptions. I show how leading philosophical defenses of the singularity hypothesis fail to overcome the case for skepticism. I conclude by drawing out philosophical and policy implications of this discussion.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48305,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-05-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02143-5\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02143-5","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
The singularity hypothesis is a hypothesis about the future of artificial intelligence on which self-improving artificial agents will quickly become orders of magnitude more intelligent than the average human. Despite the ambitiousness of its claims, the singularity hypothesis has been defended at length by leading philosophers and artificial intelligence researchers. In this paper, I argue that the singularity hypothesis rests on undersupported growth assumptions. I show how leading philosophical defenses of the singularity hypothesis fail to overcome the case for skepticism. I conclude by drawing out philosophical and policy implications of this discussion.
期刊介绍:
Philosophical Studies was founded in 1950 by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars to provide a periodical dedicated to work in analytic philosophy. The journal remains devoted to the publication of papers in exclusively analytic philosophy. Papers applying formal techniques to philosophical problems are welcome. The principal aim is to publish articles that are models of clarity and precision in dealing with significant philosophical issues. It is intended that readers of the journal will be kept abreast of the central issues and problems of contemporary analytic philosophy.
Double-blind review procedure
The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.