公司正规化战略:企业家与政府官员在执行法规中的互动

IF 9.3 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Ashenafi Biru, Pia Arenius, Garry Bruton, David Gilbert
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究探讨了早期市场经济中的企业家如何决定其遵守正式规则的程度,并发现他们与政府官员的互动方式是在一个连续的正式性过程中进行的。我们将重点放在企业家与政府官员建立关系时所采用的非市场战略方法上,建立了一个模型,显示企业家如何根据其公司的正规化程度(从低正规化到高正规化)采取相应的战略。我们借鉴了企业家的定性访谈数据,这些企业家在遵守国家规定的规则和指导方针方面表现出不同的水平。我们从理论上归纳出,决定企业的正规化水平涉及与负责规则执行的政府官员的战略互动方法。我们的研究结果表明,企业家所使用的互动策略取决于他们所拥有的政治资本、从政府官员那里获得期望的回应,以及劝阻政府官员执行正规规则或对非正规性实施制裁。我们为今后研究企业正规性的细微差别以及企业家与政府官员之间的互动提供了理论和政策启示。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Firm Formalization Strategy: The Interaction of Entrepreneurs and Government Officials in the Enforcement of Regulation
This research investigates how entrepreneurs in an early-stage market economy decide their level of compliance with formal rules and finds the manner in which they interact with government officials to operate on a continuum of formality. Focusing on the nonmarket strategy approaches entrepreneurs employ to establish relationships with government officials, we build a model that shows how entrepreneurs adopt strategies aligned with their firm’s level of formality, spanning low to high formality practices. We draw on qualitative interview data from entrepreneurs who exhibit varying levels of compliance with state-provided rules and guidelines. We inductively theorize that deciding the firms’ level of formality involves strategic interaction approaches with government officials responsible for rule enforcement. Our findings highlight that the interaction strategies entrepreneurs use hinge on the political capital they possess, eliciting the desired response from government officials, and dissuading the officials from enforcing formal rules or imposing sanctions for informality. We offer theoretical and policy implications for future work on the nuances of firm formality and the interaction between entrepreneurs and government officials.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
22.40
自引率
5.20%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Journal of Management (JOM) aims to publish rigorous empirical and theoretical research articles that significantly contribute to the field of management. It is particularly interested in papers that have a strong impact on the overall management discipline. JOM also encourages the submission of novel ideas and fresh perspectives on existing research. The journal covers a wide range of areas, including business strategy and policy, organizational behavior, human resource management, organizational theory, entrepreneurship, and research methods. It provides a platform for scholars to present their work on these topics and fosters intellectual discussion and exchange in these areas.
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