与人工智能一起美好生活:美德、教育和人工智能

IF 1.3 Q2 EDUCATION & EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
Nicholas Smith, Darby Vickers
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引用次数: 0

摘要

人工智能技术已经成为人类生活中无处不在的一部分。这促使我们追问:"我们应该如何与人工智能好好相处?目前,这个问题最主要的候选答案是原则主义。根据这些方法,如果你教给人们一些有限的原则,或者说服他们采用正确的规则,那么即使在一个不断发展和不透明的道德世界里,人们也能与人工智能很好地相处和行动。我们发现,主流的原则主义方法并不适合为人工智能提供前瞻性的道德指导。我们分析了一些拟议的原则,发现它们在过于模糊和过于具体之间摇摆不定。我们还认为,这些规则不可能有足够的灵活性来适应快速变化的环境。与此相反,我们主张用亚里士多德的美德伦理方法来处理人工智能伦理问题。亚里士多德美德伦理学提供了具体可行的指导,同时也具有灵活性;因此,它在应对前瞻性和快速变化的人工智能生活环境方面具有独特的优势。然而,美德伦理是以行为主体为基础的,而不是以行动为基础的。将美德伦理作为人工智能生活的基础,需要确保至少有一些美德代理人同时具备相关的科技专业知识。由于美德伦理并没有规定一套规则,因此它需要能为学习美德的人树立榜样的典范。培养美德具有挑战性,尤其是在没有道德圣贤的情况下。尽管困难重重,但我们认为最好的选择是尝试美德伦理所要求的,尽管没有任何培训体系能保证培养出美德的人。最后,我们就这种方法的实用性提出了两种不同的看法--两位作者各持一种看法。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Living well with AI: Virtue, education, and artificial intelligence
Artificial intelligence technologies have become a ubiquitous part of human life. This prompts us to ask, ‘how should we live well with artificial intelligence?’ Currently, the most prominent candidate answers to this question are principlist. According to these approaches, if you teach people some finite set of principles or convince them to adopt the right rules, people will be able to live and act well with artificial intelligence, even in an evolving and opaque moral world. We find the dominant principlist approaches to be ill-suited to providing forward-looking moral guidance regarding living well with artificial intelligence. We analyze some of the proposed principles to show that they oscillate between being too vague and too specific. We also argue that such rules are unlikely to be flexible enough to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances. By contrast, we argue for an Aristotelian virtue ethics approach to artificial intelligence ethics. Aristotelian virtue ethics provides a concrete and actionable guidance that is also flexible; thus, it is uniquely well placed to deal with the forward-looking and rapidly changing landscape of life with artificial intelligence. However, virtue ethics is agent-based rather than action-based. Using virtue ethics as a basis for living well with artificial intelligence requires ensuring that at least some virtuous agents also possess the relevant scientific and technical expertise. Since virtue ethics does not prescribe a set of rules, it requires exemplars who can serve as a model for those learning to be virtuous. Cultivating virtue is challenging, especially in the absence of moral sages. Despite this difficulty, we think the best option is to attempt what virtue ethics requires, even though no system of training can guarantee the production of virtuous agents. We end with two alternative visions – one from each of the two authors – about the practicality of such an approach.
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来源期刊
Theory and Research in Education
Theory and Research in Education EDUCATION & EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH-
CiteScore
2.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
22
期刊介绍: Theory and Research in Education, formerly known as The School Field, is an international peer reviewed journal that publishes theoretical, empirical and conjectural papers contributing to the development of educational theory, policy and practice.
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