{"title":"长期价值与短期利润:指数基金何时召回借出股票进行投票?","authors":"Haoyi (Leslie) Luo, Zijin (Vivian) Xu","doi":"10.1111/corg.12576","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div>\n \n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\n \n <p>In this paper, we examine the effects of share lending or recall on proxy voting, with a particular focus on the role of index funds.</p>\n </section>\n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\n \n <p>Our study reveals that higher index ownership in a firm is associated with an increased likelihood of share recall, particularly in the presence of higher institutional ownership, lower past return performance, smaller firm size, and when more shares are held by younger fund families with higher turnover ratios or higher management fees. Using the Russell 1000/2000 Index reconstitution as an exogenous shock, we establish a causal relationship between index ownership and share recall through instrumental variable (IV) analysis. Furthermore, we find a positive correlation between index ownership and share recall for proxy voting proposals related to compensation, director election, and those sponsored by management. In subsequent proxy votes, shareholder-sponsored proposals and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) proposals receive more support in firms with higher index ownership, especially when share recall is more prevalent. Our analysis does not provide evidence to support the conjecture that firms with higher index ownership are more vulnerable to empty voting issues.</p>\n </section>\n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\n \n <p>Our study enhances the understanding of how index funds recall shares during proxy voting and the impact of index ownership on voting outcomes. The findings support the practice of index funds recalling shares to actively engage in proxy voting, effectively addressing the conflict between short-term profit-seeking through securities lending and long-term governance responsibilities.</p>\n </section>\n \n <section>\n \n <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\n \n <p>We contribute to a better understanding of the role of index funds in corporate governance and shed light on the consequences of securities lending in proxy votes. These findings have important implications for investors, policymakers, and market participants in managing the potential conflicts arising from securities lending activities and promoting effective corporate governance practices.</p>\n </section>\n </div>","PeriodicalId":48209,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12576","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Long-term value versus short-term profits: When do index funds recall loaned shares for voting?\",\"authors\":\"Haoyi (Leslie) Luo, Zijin (Vivian) Xu\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/corg.12576\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div>\\n \\n \\n <section>\\n \\n <h3> Research Question/Issue</h3>\\n \\n <p>In this paper, we examine the effects of share lending or recall on proxy voting, with a particular focus on the role of index funds.</p>\\n </section>\\n \\n <section>\\n \\n <h3> Research Findings/Insights</h3>\\n \\n <p>Our study reveals that higher index ownership in a firm is associated with an increased likelihood of share recall, particularly in the presence of higher institutional ownership, lower past return performance, smaller firm size, and when more shares are held by younger fund families with higher turnover ratios or higher management fees. Using the Russell 1000/2000 Index reconstitution as an exogenous shock, we establish a causal relationship between index ownership and share recall through instrumental variable (IV) analysis. Furthermore, we find a positive correlation between index ownership and share recall for proxy voting proposals related to compensation, director election, and those sponsored by management. In subsequent proxy votes, shareholder-sponsored proposals and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) proposals receive more support in firms with higher index ownership, especially when share recall is more prevalent. Our analysis does not provide evidence to support the conjecture that firms with higher index ownership are more vulnerable to empty voting issues.</p>\\n </section>\\n \\n <section>\\n \\n <h3> Theoretical/Academic Implications</h3>\\n \\n <p>Our study enhances the understanding of how index funds recall shares during proxy voting and the impact of index ownership on voting outcomes. The findings support the practice of index funds recalling shares to actively engage in proxy voting, effectively addressing the conflict between short-term profit-seeking through securities lending and long-term governance responsibilities.</p>\\n </section>\\n \\n <section>\\n \\n <h3> Practitioner/Policy Implications</h3>\\n \\n <p>We contribute to a better understanding of the role of index funds in corporate governance and shed light on the consequences of securities lending in proxy votes. These findings have important implications for investors, policymakers, and market participants in managing the potential conflicts arising from securities lending activities and promoting effective corporate governance practices.</p>\\n </section>\\n </div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48209,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Corporate Governance-An International Review\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-02-11\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/corg.12576\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Corporate Governance-An International Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/corg.12576\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Governance-An International Review","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/corg.12576","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Long-term value versus short-term profits: When do index funds recall loaned shares for voting?
Research Question/Issue
In this paper, we examine the effects of share lending or recall on proxy voting, with a particular focus on the role of index funds.
Research Findings/Insights
Our study reveals that higher index ownership in a firm is associated with an increased likelihood of share recall, particularly in the presence of higher institutional ownership, lower past return performance, smaller firm size, and when more shares are held by younger fund families with higher turnover ratios or higher management fees. Using the Russell 1000/2000 Index reconstitution as an exogenous shock, we establish a causal relationship between index ownership and share recall through instrumental variable (IV) analysis. Furthermore, we find a positive correlation between index ownership and share recall for proxy voting proposals related to compensation, director election, and those sponsored by management. In subsequent proxy votes, shareholder-sponsored proposals and environmental, social, and governance (ESG) proposals receive more support in firms with higher index ownership, especially when share recall is more prevalent. Our analysis does not provide evidence to support the conjecture that firms with higher index ownership are more vulnerable to empty voting issues.
Theoretical/Academic Implications
Our study enhances the understanding of how index funds recall shares during proxy voting and the impact of index ownership on voting outcomes. The findings support the practice of index funds recalling shares to actively engage in proxy voting, effectively addressing the conflict between short-term profit-seeking through securities lending and long-term governance responsibilities.
Practitioner/Policy Implications
We contribute to a better understanding of the role of index funds in corporate governance and shed light on the consequences of securities lending in proxy votes. These findings have important implications for investors, policymakers, and market participants in managing the potential conflicts arising from securities lending activities and promoting effective corporate governance practices.
期刊介绍:
The mission of Corporate Governance: An International Review is to publish cutting-edge international business research on the phenomena of comparative corporate governance throughout the global economy. Our ultimate goal is a rigorous and relevant global theory of corporate governance. We define corporate governance broadly as the exercise of power over corporate entities so as to increase the value provided to the organization"s various stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm. Because of this broad conceptualization, a wide variety of academic disciplines can contribute to our understanding.