非营利组织董事会治理有多重要?互锁董事会、高管权力和董事会中的女性在高管薪酬中的作用

IF 4.2 3区 管理学 Q1 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Nara Yoon
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文建立了一个以非营利组织董事会治理结构为重点的高管薪酬模型。从 1998 年至 2014 年纽约州北部三个城市的非营利组织面板中,分析表明首席执行官(CEO)的薪酬与首席执行官和董事会的连锁董事职位呈正相关。分析结果表明,如果首席执行官在其他非营利组织的董事会中任职,在首席执行官双重身份和任期较长的领导岗位上拥有更多权力,以及如果这些组织由繁忙的董事会领导,而董事会中的大多数成员都在其他多个非营利组织的董事会中任职,那么首席执行官就能获得更多报酬。分析进一步表明,为高管提供的经济奖励取决于女性在董事会中的代表性。这些研究结果表明,董事会的治理构成在高管薪酬中起着至关重要的作用。本文讨论了对实践和未来研究的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
How Much Does Nonprofit Board Governance Matter? Role of Interlocking Directorates, Executive Power, and Women on Boards in Executive Compensation
This article develops an executive compensation model focusing on board governance structure in nonprofit organizations. Drawn from a panel of nonprofits in three Upstate New York cities from 1998 to 2014, the analysis shows that chief executive officers (CEOs) compensation is positively associated with interlocking directorships of CEOs and boards of directors. The results reveal that the executives enjoy more compensation when they serve on the boards of other nonprofit organizations, hold more power in a leadership position with CEO duality and longer tenure, and when the organizations are led by busy boards where a majority of members in the boardroom sit on the boards of multiple other nonprofits. The analysis further shows that financial rewards offered to the executives are contingent upon women’s representation in the boardroom. These findings suggest board governance composition plays a critical role in executive compensation. Implications for practice and future research are discussed.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
9.70
自引率
7.70%
发文量
33
期刊介绍: The Review of Public Personnel Administration publishes articles that reflect the varied approaches and methodologies used in the study and practice of public human resources management and labor.
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