群体合作的激励:社会性满足决策权

IF 7.8 3区管理学 Q1 MANAGEMENT

Review of Managerial Science Pub Date : 2023-09-24 DOI:10.1007/s11846-023-00698-x

Britta Butz, Pablo Guillen Alvarez, Christine Harbring

{"title":"群体合作的激励:社会性满足决策权","authors":"Britta Butz, Pablo Guillen Alvarez, Christine Harbring","doi":"10.1007/s11846-023-00698-x","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We investigate the effect of a donation incentive tied to contributions to a public good when group members can decide on the size of their donation. An up to 20% donation of the public good was implemented either exogenously or endogenously by group members. In the Vote treatment, groups could either decide in favor of or against a donation of 20% of the public good; in the Vote Share treatment, subjects could decide on a donation share of between 0 and 20%. Results show that a large percentage of the participants vote in favor of implementing a donation share in both treatments. In groups voting in favor of a 20% donation share or endogenously implementing a high donation share in the Vote Share treatment contributions to the public good are higher compared to an exogenously implemented donation share.","PeriodicalId":20992,"journal":{"name":"Review of Managerial Science","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":7.8000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Incentives for cooperation in groups: sociality meets decision rights\",\"authors\":\"Britta Butz, Pablo Guillen Alvarez, Christine Harbring\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s11846-023-00698-x\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract We investigate the effect of a donation incentive tied to contributions to a public good when group members can decide on the size of their donation. An up to 20% donation of the public good was implemented either exogenously or endogenously by group members. In the Vote treatment, groups could either decide in favor of or against a donation of 20% of the public good; in the Vote Share treatment, subjects could decide on a donation share of between 0 and 20%. Results show that a large percentage of the participants vote in favor of implementing a donation share in both treatments. In groups voting in favor of a 20% donation share or endogenously implementing a high donation share in the Vote Share treatment contributions to the public good are higher compared to an exogenously implemented donation share.\",\"PeriodicalId\":20992,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Review of Managerial Science\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":7.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-09-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Review of Managerial Science\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-023-00698-x\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"MANAGEMENT\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Review of Managerial Science","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-023-00698-x","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"MANAGEMENT","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要我们研究了当团体成员可以决定捐赠规模时，捐赠激励对公共物品的影响。多达20%的公共物品捐赠是由小组成员外源性或内源性实施的。在投票处理中，团体可以决定赞成或反对捐赠20%的公共物品;在投票份额处理中，受试者可以决定捐赠份额在0%到20%之间。结果显示，很大比例的参与者投票赞成在两种治疗中实施捐赠份额。在投票赞成20%捐赠份额或内部实施高捐赠份额的群体中，与外部实施捐赠份额相比，对公共产品的贡献更高。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

Incentives for cooperation in groups: sociality meets decision rights

查看原文本刊更多论文

Incentives for cooperation in groups: sociality meets decision rights

Abstract We investigate the effect of a donation incentive tied to contributions to a public good when group members can decide on the size of their donation. An up to 20% donation of the public good was implemented either exogenously or endogenously by group members. In the Vote treatment, groups could either decide in favor of or against a donation of 20% of the public good; in the Vote Share treatment, subjects could decide on a donation share of between 0 and 20%. Results show that a large percentage of the participants vote in favor of implementing a donation share in both treatments. In groups voting in favor of a 20% donation share or endogenously implementing a high donation share in the Vote Share treatment contributions to the public good are higher compared to an exogenously implemented donation share.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Review of Managerial Science MANAGEMENT-

CiteScore

11.30

自引率

14.50%

发文量

期刊介绍： Review of Managerial Science (RMS) provides a forum for innovative research from all scientific areas of business administration. The journal publishes original research of high quality and is open to various methodological approaches (analytical modeling, empirical research, experimental work, methodological reasoning etc.). The scope of RMS encompasses – but is not limited to – accounting, auditing, banking, business strategy, corporate governance, entrepreneurship, financial structure and capital markets, health economics, human resources management, information systems, innovation management, insurance, marketing, organization, production and logistics, risk management and taxation. RMS also encourages the submission of papers combining ideas and/or approaches from different areas in an innovative way. Review papers presenting the state of the art of a research area and pointing out new directions for further research are also welcome. The scientific standards of RMS are guaranteed by a rigorous, double-blind peer review process with ad hoc referees and the journal´s internationally composed editorial board.