D&O 保险会误导债权人的借贷决策吗?来自公司债务期限结构的证据

IF 2.8 3区 经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Qingsong Ruan, Yuetian Jin, Dayong Lv, Xiaokun Wei
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究通过考察董事及高管责任保险(D&O 保险)对公司债务期限结构的影响,研究其是否会误导债权人的借贷决策。我们发现,购买 D&O 保险会导致公司债务期限的延长,而且这种影响对公司治理较弱的公司更为明显。这些结果表明,债权人可能将 D&O 保险视为有助于改善公司治理的外部监督工具。然而,D&O 保险会诱发更高的公司风险,但却无助于降低代理成本或提高公司绩效,也就是说,它会导致更严重的管理机会主义。我们的研究结果表明,D&O 保险在一定程度上误导了债权人的贷款决策。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Does D&O insurance mislead creditors' lending decisions? Evidence from corporate debt maturity structure

This study investigates whether directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) misleads creditors' lending decisions by examining its effect on corporate debt maturity structure. We find that purchasing D&O insurance leads to increased corporate debt maturity, and this effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance. These results suggest that creditors may view D&O insurance as an external monitoring tool that helps improve corporate governance. However, D&O insurance induces higher firm risk, but cannot help decrease agency costs or improve firm performance, that is, it results in more severe managerial opportunism. Our findings suggest that D&O insurance, to some extent, misguides creditors' lending decisions.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.70
自引率
6.90%
发文量
143
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