Md Hamid Uddin, Khakan Najaf, M. Kabir Hassan, Nor Shaipah Abdul Wahab
{"title":"双董事会治理与董事会独立性:企业集团关联公司与独立公司的比较","authors":"Md Hamid Uddin, Khakan Najaf, M. Kabir Hassan, Nor Shaipah Abdul Wahab","doi":"10.1002/ijfe.2906","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>We argue that the corporate board of an exchange-listed firm cannot make an independent business decision if it has an affiliation with a conglomerate group. This is because the corporate board of a conglomerate-affiliated firm (CAF) has high moral hazard exposure due to its accountability to the superior parent board at the apex of the conglomerate structure. Based on a sample of 304 listed firms from 18 countries, we find a CAF board is less independent than a standalone board with no superior reporting body. A firm's affiliation with the conglomerate per se affects its board independence, regardless of the parent shareholding level. The additional analysis finds that the lack of board independence significantly impacts a CAF's financial performance, although the market impact is insignificant.</p>","PeriodicalId":47461,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Finance & Economics","volume":"29 4","pages":"4857-4887"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/ijfe.2906","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Dual-board governance and board independence: Conglomerate affiliate versus standalone firms\",\"authors\":\"Md Hamid Uddin, Khakan Najaf, M. Kabir Hassan, Nor Shaipah Abdul Wahab\",\"doi\":\"10.1002/ijfe.2906\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>We argue that the corporate board of an exchange-listed firm cannot make an independent business decision if it has an affiliation with a conglomerate group. This is because the corporate board of a conglomerate-affiliated firm (CAF) has high moral hazard exposure due to its accountability to the superior parent board at the apex of the conglomerate structure. Based on a sample of 304 listed firms from 18 countries, we find a CAF board is less independent than a standalone board with no superior reporting body. A firm's affiliation with the conglomerate per se affects its board independence, regardless of the parent shareholding level. The additional analysis finds that the lack of board independence significantly impacts a CAF's financial performance, although the market impact is insignificant.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47461,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Journal of Finance & Economics\",\"volume\":\"29 4\",\"pages\":\"4857-4887\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1002/ijfe.2906\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Journal of Finance & Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ijfe.2906\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Finance & Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ijfe.2906","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Dual-board governance and board independence: Conglomerate affiliate versus standalone firms
We argue that the corporate board of an exchange-listed firm cannot make an independent business decision if it has an affiliation with a conglomerate group. This is because the corporate board of a conglomerate-affiliated firm (CAF) has high moral hazard exposure due to its accountability to the superior parent board at the apex of the conglomerate structure. Based on a sample of 304 listed firms from 18 countries, we find a CAF board is less independent than a standalone board with no superior reporting body. A firm's affiliation with the conglomerate per se affects its board independence, regardless of the parent shareholding level. The additional analysis finds that the lack of board independence significantly impacts a CAF's financial performance, although the market impact is insignificant.