{"title":"RTL侧信道攻击漏洞分析","authors":"X. Lai, M. Jenihhin","doi":"10.1109/LATS58125.2023.10154497","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"How much the timing side-channel attacks' vulner-ability can be mitigated at the early RTL design phase? This paper summarizes an Invited Talk presenting basic approaches for analyzing timing side-channel attack vulnerability in a generic information flow (illustrated on an RSA algorithm implementation) and in a common security architecture. The latter assumes, as an example, a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) based chip-level authentication structure with potentially vulnerable ECC-powered Fuzzy Extractors.","PeriodicalId":145157,"journal":{"name":"2023 IEEE 24th Latin American Test Symposium (LATS)","volume":"141 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Analyzing Side-Channel Attack Vulnerabilities at RTL\",\"authors\":\"X. Lai, M. Jenihhin\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/LATS58125.2023.10154497\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"How much the timing side-channel attacks' vulner-ability can be mitigated at the early RTL design phase? This paper summarizes an Invited Talk presenting basic approaches for analyzing timing side-channel attack vulnerability in a generic information flow (illustrated on an RSA algorithm implementation) and in a common security architecture. The latter assumes, as an example, a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) based chip-level authentication structure with potentially vulnerable ECC-powered Fuzzy Extractors.\",\"PeriodicalId\":145157,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2023 IEEE 24th Latin American Test Symposium (LATS)\",\"volume\":\"141 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-03-21\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2023 IEEE 24th Latin American Test Symposium (LATS)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/LATS58125.2023.10154497\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2023 IEEE 24th Latin American Test Symposium (LATS)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/LATS58125.2023.10154497","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Analyzing Side-Channel Attack Vulnerabilities at RTL
How much the timing side-channel attacks' vulner-ability can be mitigated at the early RTL design phase? This paper summarizes an Invited Talk presenting basic approaches for analyzing timing side-channel attack vulnerability in a generic information flow (illustrated on an RSA algorithm implementation) and in a common security architecture. The latter assumes, as an example, a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) based chip-level authentication structure with potentially vulnerable ECC-powered Fuzzy Extractors.