囚犯的困境和自由操作:约翰·纳什,我想让你认识弗雷德·斯金纳。

IF 1.4 3区 心理学 Q4 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
John V. Keller
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在单独的腔室中,两对鸽子的反应在同时进行的随机比例强化计划下得到强化。对于每对鸽子,它们的时间表都是以这样一种方式耦合的,即左右键的强化概率是由这对鸽子中另一只鸽子啄的键决定的。这样,就创建了一个强化矩阵,就像博弈论中流行的囚徒困境游戏一样。所有受试者的反应很快都被数学家约翰·纳什确定的选择组合所吸引,这是囚犯困境游戏的平衡。这是在钥匙上的意外事件发生逆转前后发现的。在第二个实验中,对一对鸽子来说,选择配对鸽子的刺激几乎没有持久的影响:反应再次被游戏的平衡所吸引。结果肯定了早期的发现,证明斯金纳的正强化原理,以及纳西安数学,完全解释了迭代博弈论行为。他们将这些发现扩展到所谓的自由操作:强化时间表,其中反应不受刺激反应序列的限制(即试验程序)。本文介绍的配筋耦合时间表为经济和社会行为的实验分析提供了重要的前景。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Prisoner's dilemma and the free operant: John Nash, I'd like you to meet Fred Skinner

In separate chambers, responding by two pairs of pigeons was reinforced under concurrent random-ratio schedules of reinforcement. For each pair, the birds' schedules were coupled in such a manner that left- and right-key reinforcement probabilities were determined by the key being pecked by the other pigeon of the pair. In this way, a reinforcement matrix, like that of the popular Prisoner's Dilemma game of game theory, was created. The responding of all subjects soon gravitated to the choice combination identified by the mathematician John Nash as the equilibrium of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. This was found both before and after reversal of contingencies on the keys. In a second experiment, with a single pair of pigeons, stimuli signaling the choice of the paired pigeon had little lasting effect: responding again gravitated to the game's equilibrium. The results affirm earlier findings, demonstrating that Skinner's principle of positive reinforcement, together with Nashian mathematics, entirely accounts for iterative game-theoretic behavior. They extend these findings to the so-called free operant: to schedules of reinforcement in which responding is not constrained by stimulus–response sequencing (i.e., a trials procedure). The coupled schedule of reinforcement introduced here offers significant promise for the experimental analysis of economic and social behaviors.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.90
自引率
14.80%
发文量
83
审稿时长
>12 weeks
期刊介绍: Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior is primarily for the original publication of experiments relevant to the behavior of individual organisms.
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