Confirmation by Robustness Analysis: A Bayesian Account.

IF 0.8 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2024-01-01 Epub Date: 2022-05-11 DOI:10.1007/s10670-022-00537-7

Lorenzo Casini, Jürgen Landes

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Some authors claim that minimal models have limited epistemic value (Fumagalli, 2016; Grüne-Yanoff, 2009a). Others defend the epistemic benefits of modelling by invoking the role of robustness analysis for hypothesis confirmation (see, e.g., Levins, 1966; Kuorikoski et al., 2010) but such arguments find much resistance (see, e.g., Odenbaugh & Alexandrova, 2011). In this paper, we offer a Bayesian rationalization and defence of the view that robustness analysis can play a confirmatory role, and thereby shed light on the potential of minimal models for hypothesis confirmation. We illustrate our argument by reference to a case study from macroeconomics. At the same time, we also show that there are cases in which robustness analysis is detrimental to confirmation. We characterize these cases and link them to recent investigations on evidential variety (Landes, 2020b, 2021; Osimani and Landes, forthcoming). We conclude that robustness analysis over minimal models can confirm, but its confirmatory value depends on concrete circumstances.

查看原文本刊更多论文

稳健性分析确认：贝叶斯论述。

一些学者认为，最小模型的认识价值有限（Fumagalli, 2016; Grüne-Yanoff, 2009a）。另一些学者则援引稳健性分析对假设确认的作用，为建模的认识论益处辩护（见 Levins, 1966; Kuorikoski et al.在本文中，我们对稳健性分析可以起到确认作用的观点进行了贝叶斯合理化解释和辩护，从而阐明了最小模型在假设确认方面的潜力。我们引用宏观经济学中的一个案例来说明我们的论点。同时，我们也表明，在有些情况下，稳健性分析不利于确认。我们描述了这些情况，并将它们与最近关于证据多样性的研究联系起来（Landes，2020b，2021；Osimani 和 Landes，即将出版）。我们的结论是，对最小模型的稳健性分析可以证实，但其证实价值取决于具体情况。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文求助全文

来源期刊

ERKENNTNIS PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

2.10

自引率

11.10%

发文量

116

期刊介绍： Erkenntnis is a philosophical journal publishing papers committed in one way or another to the philosophical attitude which is signified by the label ''scientific philosophy''. It concentrates on those philosophical fields which are particularly inspired by this attitude, although other topics are welcome as well. These fields are:- Epistemology - Philosophy of science, foundations and methodology of science in general and of natural and human sciences such as physics, biology, psychology, economics, social sciences in particular - Philosophy of mathematics - Logic, philosophy of logic, and all kinds of philosophical logics - Philosophy of language - Ontology, metaphysics, theory of modality - Philosophical psychology, philosophy of mind, neurophilosophy - Practical philosophy, i.e. ethics, philosophy of action, philosophy of law, etc. One of the objectives of Erkenntnis is the provision of a suitable platform for the discussion of controversial issues; another is the provision of timely, competent reviews of important publications in an ever-growing field of research.In recent years, philosophers standing quite outside the pale of analytic philosophy have also paid careful, and indeed most welcome, attention to precision of concept and language, to arguments, and to well-grounded foundations. Erkenntnis provides for them, and for philosophers of all persuasions, a place of meeting, of discussion, and of disputation.Erkenntnis was originally founded in 1930 by Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach, it was revived in 1975 by Carl G. Hempel, Wolfang Stegmüller, and Wilhelm K. Essler. You can find more information about this in the article “Hempel: The old and the new ‘Erkenntnis’” accessible in the tabs to the right.Today, Erkenntnis is one of the leading journals in philosophy worldwide and attracts first-class authors at all stages of career; from young philosophers at the PhD level up to established academic philosophers and highly renowned senior scholars. We pride ourselves on supplying our authors with substantial referee reports, subject to a turnaround time of about three months until the first decision. The acceptance rate for publications in the journal is presently slightly below 10%.