Writing-Down Debt with Heterogeneous Creditors: Lock Laws and Late Swaps

Q3 Economics, Econometrics and Finance
S. Ghosal, Marcus Miller
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

Abstract The presence of “holdouts” in recent sovereign debt swaps poses a challenge to bargaining models which assume all creditors to be homogeneous. We modify the Rubinstein “alternating offers” framework so as to accommodate exogenous creditor heterogeneity – specifically holdouts more patient than other bondholders. The “second best” equilibrium derived is an initial offer and an associated “lock-law” sufficient to tempt impatient creditors into a prompt bond exchange. This is followed by a delayed, but more generous, swap with the patient creditors, timed to take place when the lock-law expires. In practice, however, the presence of holdouts may be endogenous: they may be late-comers who buy distressed bonds with a view to litigating for the full face value plus their costs of waiting. Provisions for protecting other bond holders from the negative externality caused by such tactics are briefly discussed. However, where the judge has mandated good faith bargaining with holdout creditors, the bargaining outcome we derive may be useful to indicate a basis for compromise.
异质债权人的减记债务:锁定法和迟期掉期
在最近的主权债务互换中,“钉子”的存在对假设所有债权人都是同质的讨价还价模型提出了挑战。我们修改了鲁宾斯坦“交替报价”框架,以适应外生债权人异质性——特别是比其他债券持有人更有耐心的债权人。由此得出的“次优”均衡是初始报价和相关的“锁定定律”,足以诱使不耐烦的债权人迅速进行债券交换。随后,与耐心的债权人进行一项延迟但更为慷慨的交换,时间定在锁定期到期时。然而,在实际操作中,“钉子”的存在可能是内生的:他们可能是后来者,购买不良债券的目的是为获得全额面值和等待成本而提起诉讼。简要讨论了保护其他债券持有人免受此类策略造成的负外部性影响的规定。然而,当法官授权与拒不让步的债权人进行诚信谈判时,我们得出的谈判结果可能有助于指出妥协的基础。
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来源期刊
Journal of Globalization and Development
Journal of Globalization and Development Economics, Econometrics and Finance-Economics, Econometrics and Finance (all)
CiteScore
1.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
13
期刊介绍: The Journal of Globalization and Development (JGD) publishes academic research and policy analysis on globalization, development, and in particular the complex interactions between them. The journal is dedicated to stimulating a creative dialogue between theoretical advances and rigorous empirical studies to push forward the frontiers of development analysis. It also seeks to combine innovative academic insights with the in-depth knowledge of practitioners to address important policy issues. JGD encourages diverse perspectives on all aspects of development and globalization, and attempts to integrate the best development research from across different fields with contributions from scholars in developing and developed countries. Topics: -Economic development- Financial investments- Development Aid- Development policies- Growth models- Sovereign debt
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