Challenge in the boardroom: Director–manager question-and-answer interactions at board meetings

IF 4.6 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Helen R. Pernelet, Niamh M. Brennan
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Research question/issue

Corporate governance codes of practice require non-executive directors (NEDs) to challenge and question managers. Prior literature and best practice guidance remain silent on the precise meaning of, and on how directors might execute, “challenge”, and how management might respond. We explore the ways in which NEDs challenge, question, and dissent during board meetings, and how managers respond. We observe, audio-record, and video-record three boards during nine board meetings. Our boards are unique in holding part of their meetings in public and part in private.

Research findings/insights

Our dataset comprises 418 questions and 510 answers. We develop a typology of NEDs' challenge/questions comprising six categories/48 subcategories and managers' responses/answers comprising eight categories/69 subcategories. Our findings support the assertion that NEDs may be reluctant to offer moderate (i.e., constructive) challenge in public. We find significant differences between the level of dissent and the types of answers offered in public versus in private. We find an association between the type of question asked and the type of answer provided. Who asks and answers questions varies significantly in public versus in private, as do the questions and answers by each board.

Theoretical/academic implications

Our empirical findings suggest board behavior varies in the presence of an audience of stakeholders. In public, boards go through the motions by engaging in the performativity of governance, while more substantive governance occurs in private.

Practitioner/policy implications

We show that regulatory calls for robust challenge by NEDs have not been met, at least judging by the three boards in our study. There is a lack of guidance and advice on how NEDs should exercise challenge and how managers might respond.

Abstract Image

董事会面临的挑战:董事会会议上董事与经理的问答互动
公司治理行为准则要求非执行董事(NEDs)挑战和质疑经理。先前的文献和最佳实践指南对“挑战”的确切含义以及董事如何执行“挑战”以及管理层如何应对保持沉默。我们探讨了需求分析师在董事会会议上挑战、质疑和异议的方式,以及管理者如何回应。我们在九次董事会会议中观察、录音和录像三个董事会。我们董事会的独特之处在于,一部分会议公开举行,一部分会议不公开举行。我们的数据集包括418个问题和510个答案。我们开发了一个由6类/48个子类别和8类/69个子类别组成的NEDs挑战/问题类型。我们的研究结果支持了这样一种说法,即ned可能不愿意在公共场合提出适度(即建设性)的挑战。我们发现不同意见的程度和公开与私下提供的答案类型之间存在显著差异。我们发现问题的类型和答案的类型之间存在关联。在公开场合和私下里,提问和回答的人有很大的不同,每个板块的提问和回答也有很大的不同。理论/学术意义我们的实证研究结果表明,董事会的行为在利益相关者在场的情况下会有所不同。在公开场合,董事会通过参与治理的表演来走过场,而更实质性的治理则发生在私下。从业人员/政策影响我们表明,至少从我们研究中的三个委员会来看,监管机构对新兴需求需求的强烈挑战尚未得到满足。缺乏指导和建议,以指导和建议需要如何行使挑战,以及管理人员如何应对。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.00
自引率
11.30%
发文量
79
期刊介绍: The mission of Corporate Governance: An International Review is to publish cutting-edge international business research on the phenomena of comparative corporate governance throughout the global economy. Our ultimate goal is a rigorous and relevant global theory of corporate governance. We define corporate governance broadly as the exercise of power over corporate entities so as to increase the value provided to the organization"s various stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm. Because of this broad conceptualization, a wide variety of academic disciplines can contribute to our understanding.
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