Caitlin A. Howlett, S. Miles, C. Berryman, A. Phillipou, G. Moseley
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引用次数: 1
Abstract
ABSTRACT Cognitive flexibility is a widely studied construct and is considered an important treatment target for several psychological disorders. The convergence of several independent fields of research has led to assumptions about the assessment of cognitive flexibility – assumptions that are not empirically supported and often conflate different notions of flexibility. This critical review discusses how the conflation of self-report and neurocognitive assessments has seemingly arisen from literature on eating disorders. We describe how seminal early observations of “inflexible” personality characteristics, communication competence research, and investigations of frontal lobe function after injury led to two methods of assessing “cognitive flexibility”. We discuss the impact that conflation of self-report and neurocognitive assessments has had on the field, and we provide recommendations for assessing cognitive flexibility in both research and clinical settings. Key Points What is already known about this topic: (1) Self-report and neurocognitive assessments of “cognitive flexibility” are commonly used in research and clinical practice. (2) There is uncertainty in the field about whether or not self-report and neurocognitive assessments of “cognitive flexibility” assess similar underlying constructs. (3) Both clinicians and researchers are susceptible to the jingle fallacy. What this topic adds: (1) This narrative critique of the literature reveals that self-report and neurocognitive assessments of “cognitive flexibility” have gradually been conflated over time. (2) Early research in eating disorders seems to have played an influential role in generating and reinforcing such conflation. (3) The assumption that self-report and neurocognitive assessments of “cognitive flexibility” are causally linked has no empirical basis and yet it has been used to explain inflexible cognitions and behaviours in people with eating disorders.
期刊介绍:
Australian Journal of Psychology is the premier scientific journal of the Australian Psychological Society. It covers the entire spectrum of psychological research and receives articles on all topics within the broad scope of the discipline. The journal publishes high quality peer-reviewed articles with reviewers and associate editors providing detailed assistance to authors to reach publication. The journal publishes reports of experimental and survey studies, including reports of qualitative investigations, on pure and applied topics in the field of psychology. Articles on clinical psychology or on the professional concerns of applied psychology should be submitted to our sister journals, Australian Psychologist or Clinical Psychologist. The journal publishes occasional reviews of specific topics, theoretical pieces and commentaries on methodological issues. There are also solicited book reviews and comments Annual special issues devoted to a single topic, and guest edited by a specialist editor, are published. The journal regards itself as international in vision and will accept submissions from psychologists in all countries.