The effect of mixing stakeholder value and profit on cooperation: You can't have your cake and eat it too

Abstract

Increasingly, for-profit firms commit to creating value for stakeholders. But what are the consequences of mixing stakeholder value and profit? In this article, we draw on insights into moral psychology to explain that a firm's commitments to stakeholder value and to profit both influence individual stakeholders' cooperation, albeit in opposite directions. We predict that mixed firms – committed to both stakeholder value and profit – are perceived as less other-regarding, and, therefore, elicit less cooperation, than stakeholder-oriented firms – balancing the interests of a broad range of stakeholders. In two series of vignette experiments, we find that this is the case for mixed firms switching between profit and stakeholder value, and for mixed firms simultaneously increasing profit and stakeholder value. By investigating mixed firms, this article expands the descriptive scope of stakeholder theory. By applying knowledge from moral psychology, and experimental methods, this work advances the micro-foundations of stakeholder theory.