Analysis of online rebates and commission formats in a retailer-Stackelberg supply chain with cashback website

IF 2.8 4区 管理学 Q2 MANAGEMENT
Peng Xu, Tiaojun Xiao
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Abstract

Motivated by the fact that many e-tailers offer online rebates through cashback websites to attract more consumers, and wield channel leadership, we construct a retailer-Stackelberg supply chain comprised of one e-tailer, one manufacturer, and one cashback website. Cashback websites have two commission formats: sharing and fixed. We first explore the online rebate strategy of the e-tailer (under the two commission formats); and then study the e-tailer's commission format selection strategy when offering rebates. Our analysis reveals that: (i) the product valuation and fraction of low-end consumers play key roles in shaping the e-tailer's online rebate and commission format selection strategies; (ii) the e-tailer's rebates increase the wholesale price under sharing commission, but decrease it under fixed commission; (iii) the e-tailer's rebates may be a trap for consumers because they may pay a higher retail price after rebates; (iv) under both commissions, the e-tailer's rebates hurt the manufacturer, but could enhance supply chain performance; and (v) when offering rebates, low-end consumers and the manufacturer are better off under sharing commission if its product valuation is sufficiently low, while high-end consumers are better off under fixed commission. Additionally, the e-tailer has a stronger incentive to provide rebates when the manufacturer acts as the leader; temporary rebate promotion may lead to a triple win situation for the manufacturer, e-tailer, and consumers.

零售商—Stackelberg供应链与现金返还网站的在线回扣和佣金形式分析
许多网络零售商通过返现网站提供在线返利,以吸引更多消费者,并掌握渠道领导权。受此启发,我们构建了一个由一家网络零售商、一家制造商和一家返现网站组成的零售商--Stackelberg 供应链。返现网站有两种佣金形式:共享和固定。我们首先探讨了网络零售商的在线返利策略(在两种佣金形式下),然后研究了网络零售商在提供返利时的佣金形式选择策略。我们的分析表明(i) 产品估值和低端消费者比例对网络零售商的在线返利和佣金形式选择策略起着关键作用;(ii) 在分享佣金下,网络零售商的返利会提高批发价,但在固定佣金下会降低批发价;(iii) 网络零售商的返利对消费者来说可能是一个陷阱,因为返利后他们可能会支付更高的零售价;(iv) 在两种佣金条件下,网络零售商的返利都会损害制造商的利益,但可以提高供应链的绩效;以及 (v) 在提供返利时,如果产品估值足够低,低端消费者和制造商在分享佣金条件下会更有利,而高端消费者在固定佣金条件下会更有利。此外,当制造商充当领导者时,网络零售商提供返利的动机更强;临时性的返利促销可能会导致制造商、网络零售商和消费者三赢的局面。
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来源期刊
DECISION SCIENCES
DECISION SCIENCES MANAGEMENT-
CiteScore
12.40
自引率
1.80%
发文量
34
期刊介绍: Decision Sciences, a premier journal of the Decision Sciences Institute, publishes scholarly research about decision making within the boundaries of an organization, as well as decisions involving inter-firm coordination. The journal promotes research advancing decision making at the interfaces of business functions and organizational boundaries. The journal also seeks articles extending established lines of work assuming the results of the research have the potential to substantially impact either decision making theory or industry practice. Ground-breaking research articles that enhance managerial understanding of decision making processes and stimulate further research in multi-disciplinary domains are particularly encouraged.
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