Closing the Gender Pay Gap: Analyst Coverage, Stakeholder Attention, and Gender Differences in Executive Compensation

IF 4.9 1区 管理学 Q1 MANAGEMENT
Massimo Maoret, Solon Moreira, Halil Sabanci
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Abstract

The gender pay gap among firms’ upper echelons is a prominent issue not only because it concerns equality in the workplace, but also because it may impact firms’ culture and performance. Responding to calls to better understand how stakeholder expectations and pressures might influence the gender pay gap, this study examines the role of a key stakeholder group, i.e., financial analysts, in curbing executive gender pay gap. Drawing on the stakeholder and attention-based views of the firm, we contend that analyst coverage may counter the pay gap by a) raising other stakeholders’ attention on discriminatory pay setting practices; and b) reducing information asymmetries in the executive labor market. Both firm- and individual-level econometric analyses on a sample of 38,211 executives working in 3,473 firms support our hypothesis: an increase in analyst firm coverage helps to reduce the gender pay gap among the top executives of S&P 1500 firms between 1992 and 2016. Post-hoc analyses - that use the closure of brokerage houses as an exogeneous shock - lend further causal support to our claims. Our results advance the literature at the nexus of the stakeholder theory and attention-based view of the firm by unveiling the role of intermediaries in channeling the limited stakeholder attention to certain firms, contributing to the development of a stakeholder-based theory of executive pay.
缩小性别薪酬差距:分析师覆盖率、利益相关者关注度和高管薪酬中的性别差异
公司高层之间的性别薪酬差距是一个突出问题,不仅因为它涉及工作场所的平等,还因为它可能影响公司的文化和业绩。为了更好地了解利益相关者的期望和压力如何影响性别薪酬差距,本研究考察了关键利益相关者群体,即财务分析师,在遏制高管性别薪酬差距方面的作用。根据公司的利益相关者和基于注意力的观点,我们认为分析师覆盖范围可以通过以下方式弥补薪酬差距:a)提高其他利益相关者对歧视性薪酬设置做法的关注;以及b)减少高管劳动力市场中的信息不对称。对3473家公司的38211名高管进行的公司和个人层面的计量经济学分析都支持我们的假设:1992年至2016年间,分析师公司覆盖范围的增加有助于缩小标准普尔1500指数成分股公司高管的性别薪酬差距。事后分析——将经纪公司的关闭作为一种外生冲击——为我们的说法提供了进一步的因果支持。我们的研究结果揭示了中介机构在将有限的利益相关者注意力引导到某些公司方面的作用,为基于利益相关者的高管薪酬理论的发展做出了贡献,从而推动了利益相关者理论和基于注意力的企业观之间的联系。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Organization Studies
Organization Studies MANAGEMENT-
CiteScore
11.50
自引率
16.70%
发文量
76
期刊介绍: Organisation Studies (OS) aims to promote the understanding of organizations, organizing and the organized, and the social relevance of that understanding. It encourages the interplay between theorizing and empirical research, in the belief that they should be mutually informative. It is a multidisciplinary peer-reviewed journal which is open to contributions of high quality, from any perspective relevant to the field and from any country. Organization Studies is, in particular, a supranational journal which gives special attention to national and cultural similarities and differences worldwide. This is reflected by its international editorial board and publisher and its collaboration with EGOS, the European Group for Organizational Studies. OS publishes papers that fully or partly draw on empirical data to make their contribution to organization theory and practice. Thus, OS welcomes work that in any form draws on empirical work to make strong theoretical and empirical contributions. If your paper is not drawing on empirical data in any form, we advise you to submit your work to Organization Theory – another journal under the auspices of the European Group for Organizational Studies (EGOS) – instead.
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