Misinformation as an Event-Model Problem.

Abstract

Why does misinformation continue to influence reasoning even after it has been corrected? Dominant accounts treat this persistence as a failure of belief updating, emphasizing propositional acceptance, motivational resistance, or memory decay. We argue that this view overlooks a key constraint on comprehension: Misinformation is typically encountered within temporally unfolding narratives and integrated into event-structured mental models. Drawing on event cognition, we propose that misinformation often acquires a causal role within an event representation, supporting prediction, explanation, and inference. Corrections that merely negate false information remove a causal element without restoring model completeness, leaving incoherent representations that invite compensatory inference and the reemergence of misinformation. By contrast, our framework predicts that corrections that align with event boundaries and provide factually accurate, causally adequate replacements should be more likely to stabilize updated representations. This event-model perspective unifies continued influence effects, delayed resurgence of misinformation, and inference-based false memory. It suggests that effective interventions must not only revise beliefs but also restore coherence in narrative event models.