Rethinking Mahr: Gendered Bargaining, Legal Institutions, and Women's Economic Security in Iran's Welfare Regime

Abstract

This article re‐examines mahr (a groom‐to‐bride transfer stipulated in the marriage contract) as a gendered institution embedded in Iran's welfare and legal regime. Drawing on a theory‐informed thematic analysis of scholarship from Iran and comparative contexts, the study integrates feminist political economy, feminist legal theory, social exchange theory, gendered bargaining theory, and institutional economics to examine how welfare structures, legal institutions, and bargaining processes shape the operation of mahr. The findings indicate that mahr's protective role is conditional rather than guaranteed. Although deferred mahr may increase the costs of marital dissolution, its practical value depends on enforcement credibility, women's outside options, and broader welfare conditions. Where public social protection and income‐based maintenance are limited, mahr assumes disproportionate importance yet remains structurally constrained. Strengthening post‐divorce alimony and income‐based maintenance, expanding social protection, and improving women's access to employment and credit would reduce reliance on mahr as a substitute for welfare.