Aspiration and seeking understanding

IF 1.4 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Katelyn E. O’Dell
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

There is a certain kind of work many of us do on ourselves, in which we effortfully change something core about who we are and what we value. Call this work toward improved valuing, ‘aspiration,’ following Agnes Callard. This paper offers an account of aspiration. This account, which I’ll call the Seeking Understanding account, differs from Callard’s own. As such, it avoids a problem I raise for a view like Callard’s: on it, the aspirant is problematically self-focused. Callard is aware of this objection and responds to it, but, I argue, her response is not adequate. To set up the alternative account of aspiration, I develop a distinction increasingly theorized in epistemology: the knowledge/understanding distinction. I offer reasons for thinking of evaluative understanding as requiring not just intellectual but also affective and motivational engagement with its target. According to the Seeking Understanding account, aspiration is seeking this sort of evaluative understanding. After illuminating the contours of the account, I raise a challenge for it in the form of an interesting question that lacks a ready answer. I take initial steps toward an answer, including an important clarification about the Seeking Understanding account of aspiration.
渴望与寻求理解
我们中的许多人都对自己做了一些特定的工作,在这些工作中,我们努力地改变了一些关于我们是谁和我们所看重的东西的核心。按照阿格尼斯·卡拉德(Agnes Callard)的说法,把这种朝着提高价值的方向进行的工作称为“抱负”。这篇文章提供了一种抱负的描述。这个描述,我称之为“寻求理解”,不同于Callard自己的描述。因此,它避免了我为卡拉德的观点提出的一个问题:在这个问题上,有抱负的人有问题地以自我为中心。卡拉德意识到了这种反对意见,并对此作出了回应,但我认为,她的回应是不充分的。为了建立对渴望的另一种解释,我在认识论中提出了一种日益理论化的区分:知识/理解的区分。我提供了一些理由,说明评估性理解不仅需要智力上的参与,还需要与目标进行情感和动机上的接触。根据寻求理解的说法,渴望就是寻求这种可评价的理解。在阐明了这个描述的轮廓之后,我以一个缺乏现成答案的有趣问题的形式对它提出了挑战。我为找到答案迈出了第一步,包括对“寻求理解”对渴望的解释做了重要的澄清。
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来源期刊
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
7.70%
发文量
127
期刊介绍: Philosophical Studies was founded in 1950 by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars to provide a periodical dedicated to work in analytic philosophy. The journal remains devoted to the publication of papers in exclusively analytic philosophy. Papers applying formal techniques to philosophical problems are welcome. The principal aim is to publish articles that are models of clarity and precision in dealing with significant philosophical issues. It is intended that readers of the journal will be kept abreast of the central issues and problems of contemporary analytic philosophy. Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.
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