{"title":"Aspiration and seeking understanding","authors":"Katelyn E. O’Dell","doi":"10.1007/s11098-026-02494-1","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"There is a certain kind of work many of us do on ourselves, in which we effortfully change something core about who we are and what we value. Call this work toward improved valuing, ‘aspiration,’ following Agnes Callard. This paper offers an account of aspiration. This account, which I’ll call the Seeking Understanding account, differs from Callard’s own. As such, it avoids a problem I raise for a view like Callard’s: on it, the aspirant is problematically self-focused. Callard is aware of this objection and responds to it, but, I argue, her response is not adequate. To set up the alternative account of aspiration, I develop a distinction increasingly theorized in epistemology: the knowledge/understanding distinction. I offer reasons for thinking of evaluative understanding as requiring not just intellectual but also affective and motivational engagement with its target. According to the Seeking Understanding account, aspiration is seeking this sort of evaluative understanding. After illuminating the contours of the account, I raise a challenge for it in the form of an interesting question that lacks a ready answer. I take initial steps toward an answer, including an important clarification about the Seeking Understanding account of aspiration.","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"253 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2026-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-026-02494-1","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
There is a certain kind of work many of us do on ourselves, in which we effortfully change something core about who we are and what we value. Call this work toward improved valuing, ‘aspiration,’ following Agnes Callard. This paper offers an account of aspiration. This account, which I’ll call the Seeking Understanding account, differs from Callard’s own. As such, it avoids a problem I raise for a view like Callard’s: on it, the aspirant is problematically self-focused. Callard is aware of this objection and responds to it, but, I argue, her response is not adequate. To set up the alternative account of aspiration, I develop a distinction increasingly theorized in epistemology: the knowledge/understanding distinction. I offer reasons for thinking of evaluative understanding as requiring not just intellectual but also affective and motivational engagement with its target. According to the Seeking Understanding account, aspiration is seeking this sort of evaluative understanding. After illuminating the contours of the account, I raise a challenge for it in the form of an interesting question that lacks a ready answer. I take initial steps toward an answer, including an important clarification about the Seeking Understanding account of aspiration.
期刊介绍:
Philosophical Studies was founded in 1950 by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars to provide a periodical dedicated to work in analytic philosophy. The journal remains devoted to the publication of papers in exclusively analytic philosophy. Papers applying formal techniques to philosophical problems are welcome. The principal aim is to publish articles that are models of clarity and precision in dealing with significant philosophical issues. It is intended that readers of the journal will be kept abreast of the central issues and problems of contemporary analytic philosophy.
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The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.