How to defend realism about impossible fiction without the principle of poetic license

Abstract

One strategy sometimes employed in defense of realism about impossible fiction is the endorsement of the principle of poetic license. While the principle of poetic license has become the focus of much discussion on impossible fiction, I argue that the principle of poetic license is neither necessary nor sufficient for realism about impossible fiction. The principle can be strengthened so as to entail realism about impossible fiction, but I argue that the strengthened principle is empirically inadequate given the data provided by fictionality puzzles. I then provide a different argument from existential generalization for realism about impossible fiction which does not rely on either variant of the principle of poetic license. I suggest that this position, which leaves open the possibility that certain sets of propositions could not be jointly true-in-fiction, accommodates the data provided by fictionality puzzles and is more theoretically attractive than an account that endorses either variant of the principle of poetic license. Following which, I defend realism about impossible fiction from error theories about impossible fiction.