A Call for Conceptual Clarity: "Emotion" as an Umbrella Term Did Not Work-Let's Narrow It Down.

Abstract

To cut a long story short, the term "emotion" is predominantly employed as a comprehensive designation, encompassing phenomena such as feelings, affective processing, experiences, expressions, and, on occasion, cognitive processes. This has given rise to a plethora of schools of thought that diverge in their inclusion of these phenomena, not to mention the discordance regarding what emotions belong to the so-called set of discrete emotions in the first place. This is a problem, because clear and operational definitions are paramount for ensuring the comparability of research findings across studies and also across different disciplines. In response to this disagreement, it is here proposed to simplify the definition of the term "emotion", instead of using it as an umbrella term overarching an unclear set of multiple phenomena, which is exactly what left all of us uncertain about the question what an emotion actually is. From an etymological perspective, the simplest suggestion is to understand an emotion as behavior (from the Latin verb 'emovere', meaning to move out, and thus the noun 'emotion' meaning out-movement). This suggests that an emotion should not be understood as something felt, nor as a physiological reaction, or anything including cognition. Instead, emotions should be understood as behavioral outputs (not as information processing), with their connection to feelings being that they convey them. Consider fear, which should not be classified as an emotion, it should be understood as a feeling (fear is felt). The specific body posture, facial expression, and other behavioral manifestations resulting from muscle contractions should be classified as emotions with their purpose being to communicate the felt fear to conspecifics. The underlying causative basis for all that exists is affective processing (i.e., neural activity), and it provides evaluative information to support decision-making. The essence of this model is that if affective processing responds above a certain threshold, chemicals are released, which leads to a feeling (e.g., felt fear) if the respective organism is capable of conscious experience. Finally, the communication of these feelings to conspecifics is happening by emotion-behavior (i.e., emotions). In summary, affective processing guides behavior, and emotions communicate feelings. This perspective significantly simplifies the concept of an emotion and will prevent interchangeable use of emotion-related terms. Last but not least, according to the current model, emotions can also be produced voluntarily in order to feign a certain feeling, which is performed in various social settings. Applications of this model to various fields, including clinical psychology, show how beneficial it is.