From Conflict to Counsel: The Interplay of Board-TMT Cognitive Conflict, TMT Tenure, and Board Tenure on Board Advice Giving

IF 5.5 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Corporate Governance-An International Review Pub Date : 2025-02-19 DOI:10.1111/corg.12643

Dennis B. Veltrop, Irene Mostert, Paula M. G. Dirks, Jakob de Haan

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Research Question/Issue

We recognize the collaborative nature of board advice giving and investigate (1) how the level of cognitive conflict between boards and top management teams (TMTs) is associated with board advice giving and (2) how this relation is shaped by TMT tenure and board tenure.

Research Findings/Insights

Using insights from a unique multi-source dataset from 285 board members of 102 Dutch financial firms, we find that TMT tenure and board tenure both moderate the relation between board-TMT cognitive conflict and board advice giving. In addition, when considering the combined moderating effect of TMT tenure and board tenure, we find that board-TMT cognitive conflict is most positively (negatively) associated with board advice giving when TMT tenure is low (high), while board tenure is high (low).

Theoretical/Academic Implications

Our work complements prior work by integrating insights from group research and resource dependence theory. It provides a nuanced view on the link between board-TMT cognitive conflict and board advice giving. We highlight that the way cognitive conflict translates into board advice depends not only on the TMT's receptiveness to board challenge but also on the board's in-depth understanding of organizational affairs.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

Our work points out that boards taking a critical stance may backfire if boards do not “measure up” to TMTs' organizational experience. We contest that longer-tenured boards are ill-equipped to provide critical advice and highlight the crucial role of TMT tenure therein. As such, policymakers and organizations should consider the combined impact of TMT tenure and board tenure when trying to stimulate that boards effectively challenge management.

Abstract Image

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从冲突到建议：董事会-TMT认知冲突、TMT任期和董事会任期对董事会建议的相互作用

研究问题/议题我们认识到董事会提供建议的协作性质，并调查(1)董事会和高层管理团队（TMTs）之间的认知冲突水平如何与董事会提供建议相关联，以及(2)高层管理团队任期和董事会任期如何塑造这种关系。研究结果/见解利用来自102家荷兰金融公司285名董事会成员的独特多源数据集的见解，我们发现TMT任期和董事会任期都调节了董事会-TMT认知冲突与董事会建议之间的关系。此外，在考虑TMT任期和董事会任期的联合调节作用时，我们发现当TMT任期低（高）和董事会任期高（低）时，董事会-TMT认知冲突与董事会建议的正向（负向）关系最为显著。理论/学术意义我们的工作通过整合群体研究和资源依赖理论的见解来补充先前的工作。它对董事会- tmt认知冲突与董事会建议之间的联系提供了细致入微的观点。我们强调，认知冲突转化为董事会建议的方式不仅取决于TMT对董事会挑战的接受程度，还取决于董事会对组织事务的深入理解。从业者/政策影响我们的工作指出，如果董事会不能“衡量”tmt的组织经验，采取批评立场的董事会可能会适得其反。我们认为，任期较长的董事会不具备提供关键建议的能力，并强调了TMT任期在其中的关键作用。因此，政策制定者和组织在试图刺激董事会有效地挑战管理层时，应该考虑TMT任期和董事会任期的综合影响。

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来源期刊

Corporate Governance-An International Review Multiple-

CiteScore

7.00

自引率

11.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The mission of Corporate Governance: An International Review is to publish cutting-edge international business research on the phenomena of comparative corporate governance throughout the global economy. Our ultimate goal is a rigorous and relevant global theory of corporate governance. We define corporate governance broadly as the exercise of power over corporate entities so as to increase the value provided to the organization"s various stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm. Because of this broad conceptualization, a wide variety of academic disciplines can contribute to our understanding.