(In)Attention: distracted shareholders and corporate innovation

Abstract

Following Kempf et al. (2017), this study employs an identification strategy that exploits exogenous shocks to unrelated parts of institutional shareholders’ portfolios to measure “distraction.” I find institutional shareholder “distraction” significantly and positively affects future innovation output and input. This positive effect exhibits considerable cross-sectional and intertemporal heterogeneity. Further, the positive effect is stronger in firms where institutional shareholder monitoring is less important or efficient, or firms subject to greater managerial myopia. These include innovative firms, firms with lower product market competition, weaker managerial power and stronger monitoring, and lower institutional ownership such that any given distraction is more impactful. Consequently, distraction enhances shareholder value through its positive impact on innovation. Taken together, the evidence suggests that managers respond to reduced myopic pressures, induced by exogenous shocks to institutional investors’ portfolios that shift their attention away, by pursuing long-term, risky and value-increasing investments such as innovation. Potential limitations of this study and their implications for future research are also thoroughly discussed.