Do the specific characteristics of female directors work as alternative governance mechanisms to restrict earnings management in a developing country?

IF 2.8 3区 经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Haseeb Ur Rahman, Muhammad Zahid, Mamdouh Abdulaziz Saleh Al-Faryan, Anas A. Salameh
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Abstract

This inquiry probes whether or not female directors and their specific characteristics effectively restrict earnings management (EM) measured by accrual-based earnings management (AEM) and real-based earnings management (REM) in a sample of 217 Pakistani companies from 2016 to 2021. The outcomes of the ordinary least squares with panel corrected standard errors demonstrated that boards with female directors are more effective in restricting EM than others. The results also explain that the proportion of female directors on the board and audit committee and the experience of the former are significantly and inversely associated with AEM and REM. However, women directors should be at least two or more on the board to effectively control AEM and REM since the role of a lone female director is insignificant in their mitigation. The positive effect of the female directors' master's or above qualification is slightly higher than their bachelor's or below education in opposing AEM and REM. Furthermore, the business education of female directors significantly, while their non-business education insignificantly reduces AEM and REM. The findings are consistent and reliable for being validated by the generalised method of moments as an alternative estimator. Overall, the inquiry complements the literature, theory, practice, and policy in several ways.

在发展中国家,女性董事的具体特征是否可以作为限制盈余管理的替代治理机制?
本文以2016年至2021年的217家巴基斯坦公司为样本,探讨了女性董事及其具体特征是否有效地限制了以权责发生制盈余管理(AEM)和基于真实的盈余管理(REM)衡量的盈余管理(EM)。经小组标准误差修正后的普通最小二乘结果表明,拥有女性董事的董事会在限制新兴市场方面比其他董事会更有效。研究结果还解释了董事会和审计委员会中女性董事的比例以及女性董事的经历与AEM和REM呈显著负相关。然而,由于女性董事在缓解AEM和REM方面的作用不显著,因此董事会中至少应该有两名或两名以上女性董事才能有效控制AEM和REM。女性董事的硕士及以上学历对AEM和REM的正向影响略高于本科及以下学历,且女性董事的商业教育显著降低了AEM和REM,而非商业教育对其影响不显著。通过广义矩量法作为替代估计量验证了研究结果的一致性和可靠性。总的来说,调查在几个方面补充了文献、理论、实践和政策。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.70
自引率
6.90%
发文量
143
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