Defending a series signaling system against uncertain attack time with individual protection, false nodes, and overarching protection

Abstract

This research addresses the resource allocation problem in protecting a series signaling system against intentional attacks considering uncertainties of attack time. We consider the integration of individual protection, deployment of false nodes, and overarching protection strategies to enhance system reliability. To model the strategic interaction between the attacker and defender, we formulate a two-stage min-max game model. Through numerical experiments, we analyze attack strategies aimed at maximizing the vulnerability of the entire system and discuss defense strategies focused on minimizing the total expected probability of destruction. Our findings reveal that the rate of resource stockpiling plays a pivotal role in determining system vulnerability, particularly under conditions of uncertain attack time. Furthermore, our study challenges the traditional intuition that a conservative centralized defense strategy is the most effective approach in such scenarios. These insights offer practical guidance for a system owner to improve system reliability when the attack time is uncertain.