Zero-Determinant Incentive Strategy for Transaction Trading in Blockchain System

IF 4.7 2区计算机科学 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS

IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management Pub Date : 2025-02-10 DOI:10.1109/TNSM.2025.3540036

Liang Feng;Cunqing Hua;Jianan Hong

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Blockchain has been widely applied in many industries to provide secure and reliable services, in which the activities of the participating nodes are recorded as transactions. Although the original design assumes nodes disseminate the transactions voluntarily, they may be reluctant to provide transactions for others due to the lack of cooperative incentives. To fill the gap, we study the transaction collecting process in the blockchain system under the leader-based consensus protocol. Specifically, we design an incentive scheme to reward the followers if they provide unique transactions to the leader. Considering the selfish nature of different nodes, we model the transaction trading process between nodes as an Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD), and a modified zero-determinant (ZD) strategy is proposed such that the follower could correlate the leader’s payoff with the leader’s cooperation probability. We theoretically prove the effectiveness of our proposed algorithm. Simulation results show the leader’s payoff changes under the follower’s different control functions. The proposed scheme can regulate the behavior of blockchain nodes during the transaction trading process.

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b区块链系统中交易交易的零决定激励策略

区块链已广泛应用于许多行业，提供安全可靠的服务，其中参与节点的活动被记录为事务。虽然原设计假设节点自愿传播交易，但由于缺乏合作激励，节点可能不愿意为其他节点提供交易。为了填补这一空白，我们研究了基于领导者共识协议的区块链系统中的事务收集过程。具体来说，我们设计了一个激励方案，如果追随者向领导者提供独特的交易，就会得到奖励。考虑到不同节点的自私性，我们将节点间的交易过程建模为迭代囚徒困境（IPD），并提出了一种改进的零决定策略（ZD），使追随者能够将领导者的收益与领导者的合作概率相关联。从理论上证明了算法的有效性。仿真结果表明，在不同的控制函数下，领导者的收益发生了变化。该方案可以对区块链节点在交易过程中的行为进行规范。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management Computer Science-Computer Networks and Communications

CiteScore

9.30

自引率

15.10%

发文量

325

期刊介绍： IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management will publish (online only) peerreviewed archival quality papers that advance the state-of-the-art and practical applications of network and service management. Theoretical research contributions (presenting new concepts and techniques) and applied contributions (reporting on experiences and experiments with actual systems) will be encouraged. These transactions will focus on the key technical issues related to: Management Models, Architectures and Frameworks; Service Provisioning, Reliability and Quality Assurance; Management Functions; Enabling Technologies; Information and Communication Models; Policies; Applications and Case Studies; Emerging Technologies and Standards.