The Strength of Showing Weakness: Organizational Supplication and Investor Reactions to Workforce Downsizing

IF 9.3 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Matthias Brauer, Louis Vandepoele
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Strategy research usually assumes that displays of weakness are disadvantageous for firms. In this study, we challenge this assumption. We propose that deliberate displays of weakness can help firms preserve stakeholder approval when taking controversial decisions. To test this proposition, we examine the use and effectiveness of organizational supplication in the context of workforce downsizing. Building on impression management theory, we predict that firms portray themselves as weak through downward earnings management before workforce downsizing announcements, and that this supplication tactic helps attenuate investors’ negative reactions. Moreover, we posit that supplication paired with an efficiency-focused verbal justification for the downsizing is particularly effective at attenuating negative investor reactions to downsizing announcements, as an additional verbal justification lends authenticity to the downsizing firm’s supplication attempt. Yet, we also theorize that organizational supplication through downward earnings management is less effective if positive firm evaluations by security analysts and the business media make it appear inauthentic. The empirical analysis of nearly 600 workforce downsizing announcements by the largest listed U.S. firms between 2001 and 2020 supports our theoretical predictions.
展示弱点的力量:组织恳求和投资者对裁员的反应
战略研究通常假设弱点的表现对公司是不利的。在这项研究中,我们挑战了这一假设。我们建议,在做出有争议的决策时,故意展示弱点可以帮助公司保持利益相关者的认可。为了验证这一命题,我们研究了在劳动力缩减的背景下组织恳求的使用和有效性。在印象管理理论的基础上,我们预测公司在宣布裁员之前通过向下的盈余管理将自己描绘成弱者,这种恳求策略有助于减轻投资者的负面反应。此外,我们假设,恳求与以效率为中心的裁员口头辩护相结合,在减轻投资者对裁员公告的负面反应方面特别有效,因为额外的口头辩护为裁员公司的恳求尝试提供了真实性。然而,我们也推论,如果证券分析师和商业媒体的积极企业评价使其显得不真实,那么通过向下盈余管理的组织恳求就不那么有效。对2001年至2020年间美国最大上市公司近600份裁员公告的实证分析支持了我们的理论预测。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
22.40
自引率
5.20%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Journal of Management (JOM) aims to publish rigorous empirical and theoretical research articles that significantly contribute to the field of management. It is particularly interested in papers that have a strong impact on the overall management discipline. JOM also encourages the submission of novel ideas and fresh perspectives on existing research. The journal covers a wide range of areas, including business strategy and policy, organizational behavior, human resource management, organizational theory, entrepreneurship, and research methods. It provides a platform for scholars to present their work on these topics and fosters intellectual discussion and exchange in these areas.
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